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Introduction 
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is closely bound up with his conception of 
language. In fact, one could say that the status he designates to philosophy is a logical 
outcome of his conception of language. In both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
and the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein attempts to articulate a conception 
of language by exploring its essence - that is, its structure and function. What this 
amounts to is giving an account of the limit of language - an account of which types of 
expression count as meaningful. So doing, the bounds of sense would be drawn. To 
use Wittgenstein's terminology, 'what can be said' and 'what cannot be said' would be 
clearly delineated. Since language is the expression of thought, an account of the limit 
of language amounts to an account of the limit of thought. And an account of the limit 
of thought is an account of the limit of what can be done intellectually. 
The boundary, we come to see, is drawn differently for different reasons in the two 
books. The Wittgenstein of the TLP believed that the logical structure of language lies 
beneath its surface structure. It is something hidden and not perspicuous to language-
users. By excavating its structure, he would thus reveal the limit oflanguage and hence 
the limit of thought. On the TLP account of language, philosophical propositions come 
out as an attempt to go beyond the bounds of sense. Philosophy, as it is traditionally 
practised, does not, according to Wittgenstein, fall within the limit of thought. It does 
not fall within the bounds ofwhat can be done intellectually. Philosophical 
propositions are attempts to say what cannot be said. They are attempts to transcend, 
in language, the limit of language, and hence the limit of what we are able to do 
intellectually. Any attempt to transgress the bounds of sense ends, according to 
Wittgenstein, in nonsensical discourse. That is, it does not qualify as meaningful 
discourse. Philosophical propositions, being such attempts, are thus meaningless or 
nonsensical. They are not false, but simply lack sense. They are pseudo-propositions. 
As with the TLP, where Wittgenstein's views on philosophy were seen to be the 
logical consequences of this account of language, so too with the PI. However, the PI 
endorses a conception of language different to that of the TLP. But the conception of 
philosophy remains, in essence, the same. And his task is the same: to draw the limit of 
sense - to indicate what can be said and what cannot be said, and hence draw the limit 
of what we can do intellectually. Whereas the early Wittgenstein believed that he had 
discovered the essence of language and thus revealed the limit of language, the later 
Wittgenstein (post-TLP Wittgenstein) does not speak of the language but of different 
uses oflanguage or 'language-games'. Consequently, there is no such thing as the limit 
of language, but limits of language. There are thus no absolute criteria of meaningful 
propositions. What qualifies as a nonsensical proposition - one that cannot be said - is 
now given relative to a particular language-game or use oflanguage. On the PI's 
account of language, philosophical propositions come out meaningless relative to a 
particular language-game, namely, factual discourse. That is, taken as factual 
statements (which is how philosophers take them), they are meaningless. In the PI 
philosophical propositions tum out to be attempts to pass off non-factual propositions 
as factual ones. It is in this sense that they transgress the bounds of sense. They go 
beyond what can be meaningfully said in the language-game they purport to belong to. 
My thesis will concentrate on Wittgenstein's account of language and metaphysics in 
the TLP. Although I have already begun a fair amount of work on issues in the PI, I 
have restricted myself to presenting a general outline of some of the key differences 




I have used the following standard abbreviations in my thesis: 
TLP 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974 (Pears 
and Mcguinness translation) 
PI 'Philosophical Investigations', Basil Blackwell, 1953 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
translation) 
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[A] LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD 
In the TLP Wittgenstein arrives at certain conclusions about the nature of 
philosophical statements. These conclusions are the outcome of his account of 
language. What I want to examine here is what that account is and how it generates 
the conclusions it does. 
Wittgenstein's account of language has two notable features: 
(i) It is an account derived from a priori considerations of language 
(ii) It takes the form of a critique oflanguage 
In both these respects, his account is Kantian in spirit. Below I give a brief 
introductory exposition of these two aspects. 
(i) Wittgenstein's inquiry into the nature oflanguage takes the form of the question: 
how is language possible? His account starts with the existence of factual language. It 
is a fact that language is possible. We do succeed in making statements about the 
world. What Wittgenstein wanted to know is, what makes this possible? He was thus 
looking for the a priori conditions for language to work. In the PI, where he 
comments on his views in the TLP, he says: 
... the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a 
requirement. (PI 1 07) 
In other words, that language had such and such features was a requirement, was 
necessitated, in order for language (fact-stating discourse about the world) to be 
possible. Importantly, this account of language is not something discovered. It is not 
the result of an investigation. It is demanded a priori to explain the connection 
between language and the world. Again in the PI we find him saying: 
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We ask "What is language?" "What is a proposition ?" And the answer to these questions is to 
be given once for all; and independently of any future experience. (PI 92) 
This again indicates his conviction that his account must be an a priori one1- that is, 
one that must be given independently of any experience. In this way Wittgenstein' s 
inquiry echoes that of Kant. To wit: Kant started off by acknowledging that we have 
knowledge (he did not go the sceptical route and ask whether we can claim to have 
any knowledge). What he wanted to know was, what made knowledge possible. 
Wittgenstein, in producing an account of language by asking how language is possible, 
proceeds thus in the Kantian spirit. Just as Kant took knowledge forgranted, 
Wittgenstein took fact-stating discourse forgranted, and asked which conditions must 
obtain. 
(ii) Wittgenstein's account oflanguage amounts to a critique of language. A critique of 
language is an account of the limits of language - an account of which expressions can 
properly be said to belong to language. In Wittgenstein's account of what makes 
language possible, the world (or rather, the logical structure of the world) plays a 
limiting role with regard to language. This is how. The specific words in our language 
are a matter of convention. That we call a cat, and not a dog, 'cat', is arbitrary. We 
could just as well have called a cat 'dog' and a dog 'cat'. However, the way in which 
we combine words in a sentence is not entirely arbitrary. There are correct and 
incorrect ways of combining words. What determines what counts as a correct 
combination is what Wittgenstein calls 'the logical structure of the world'. The logical 
structure of the world limits the kinds of ways words can be combined in sentences. In 
this sense it determines which expressions are to count as belonging to language. 
Language, then, is limited or bound by the logical structure of the world. Now, since 
the domain of language is the domain of thought, to say that language is limited is to 
say that thought, or the thinkable, is limited. Wittgenstein is hereby putting a limit on 
what can be done intellectually. By providing an account of language where language 
turns out to be limited, Wittgenstein' s account is again Kantian in spirit. Kant, in his 
1 This can be contrasted with the PI account of language: in the PI an account of language is not to be 
given a priori, it is to be an empirical account- one that is discovered; secondly, in the PI there is no 
such thing as an answer once and for all. 
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Critique ofPure Reason, attempted to articulate the limit of pure reason. And here in 
the TLP, Wittgenstein attempts to present the limit of language (thought), and 
consequently the limit of what can be done intellectually. These two features of 
Wittgenstein's account oflanguage are important to bear in mind as a back-drop 
against which to examine the claims he makes about the nature of language. It will help 
to give context to his statements about language and in so doing throw light upon the 
general direction of his exposition. 
In the process of explaining how language is possible, Wittgenstein makes a number of 
claims about the structure of language, the structure of the world, and the relation 
between language and the world. These claims he believes are a priori necessary ones: 
ones which state what must obtain if language is possible. His statements about the 
world are consequences of his theory of language. However, in the TLP Wittgenstein 
places the former claims first. Some commentators have found this to be the wrong 
way around. If language reveals the (logical) characteristics of the world, then the 
story should be told in that order - that is, the exposition about language first, and then 
the exposition about the world. Consequently, these commentators (for example 
Kenny)2, when presenting an exegesis ofWittgenstein's work, start offby first 
examining those statements in the TLP which deal with propositions, and then follow 
with an exegesis of his account of the nature of the world. Other commentators, 
however, have thought it important to stick to the order in the TLP. Fogelin3, for 
example, sees the method of the TLP as natural. It begins with the claim that the world 
is all that there is (the totality of facts), and then goes on to examine an important 
subset of this totality, namely, those facts (language, or the propositions oflanguage) 
that are used to represent other facts (the structure of the world). Thus, maintains 
Fogelin, irrespective of how the argument may proceed, the account of language 
presupposes the account of the world. Another commentator, Fann4, holds a similar 
view, but for different reasons: although Wittgenstein's statements about the world are 
conclusions from the exposition on language, the latter is preceded by the former 
because the former (his account of the world) anticipates, and is required by the theory 
2 Kenny, A., 1973. 
3 Fogelin, R., 1976, p3. 
4 Fann, K.T. 1969. 
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oflanguage which follows it. Moreover, although it is language which reveals the 
structure of the world, the latter idea (that the world has a fixed logical structure) is 
one that Wittgenstein already contemplated, in rudimentary form, before working out 
his account of language. Thus we find him saying, in Notebooks (page 53)5 : 
The great problem round which everything that I write turns is: Is there an order in the world a 
priori, and if so what does it consist in? 
Norman Malcolm claims that Wittgenstein's view of the logical structure of the world 
is one of the ideas that inspired his writings in the TLP. His entry on page 53 of 
Notebooks, as well as another entry on page 62 in Notebooks6 ('The world has a fixed 
structure'), seems to confirm this view. It seems then, that although language reveals 
the structure if the world (for Wittgenstein), the idea of the world having a (fixed) 
structure may have preceded his claims about language. 
In my exposition I will follow the latter two commentators and present Wittgenstein' s 
theory of the world first. Apart from their considerations, my other reason for 
proceeding in this way is simply that it appears, to me at any rate, that understanding 
his statements about language is facilitated when one approaches them against the 
backdrop of his account of the world. I thus proceed by giving his account of the 
world first. 
[B] THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD 
The world, according to Wittgenstein, is the totality of facts in logical space. A fact is 
the existence of a state-of-affairs. A state-of-affairs is a configuration or combination 
of objects. An object is a simple substance. Every object, to be an object, must be able 
to enter into combinations with other objects. The possibility that each object has of 
combining with other objects, is called its 'space.' The totality of such space is called 
logical space. Since objects always occur in combination with other objects, the basic 
5 Notebooks, p53 quoted in ibid. 1969, p6. 
6 Notebooks, p62 quoted in ibid. 1969, p6. 
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constituents of the factual world are elementary facts. Elementary facts have two 
aspects: (i) they consist of objects and (ii) objects are arranged in particular 
combinations. The world then consists ultimately of the totality of elementary facts. So 
the task of explaining how factual discourse is possible is the task of explaining how it 
is possible to use language to represent elementary facts. This is Wittgenstein's 
ontology in brief There are a number of features pertaining to his notions of' object', 
'fact', 'state-of -affairs' and 'logical space' which are going to play a role in his 
argument later on. I want to tum to these notions now, but this time by making 
systematic reference to the text. The TLP opens with the following propositions: 
1. The world is all that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by there being all the facts. 
1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case. 
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world. 
The first proposition is elucidated by the second. In the second, he distinguishes 
betweenfacts and things. At this point there is too little information to say what this 
distinction consists in. Proposition 1. 11 basically asserts the same thing as proposition 
1. 1 - that is, that the world consists of the totality of facts, but the emphasis is 
different. To wit: the import of proposition 1.1 seems to be to make a distinction 
between facts and things whereas proposition 1. 11 articulates a principle of closure 
or limitation1 • Although it cannot be seen at this point, this closure principle, which 
rules out as part of the world whatever does not fall within the domain of facts, will 
allow Wittgenstein to argue that something cannot lie within the world unless it is fact. 
At proposition 1.13 the notion of 'logical space' is introduced: 'The facts in logical 
space are the world.' 
This notion, we will come to see, is going to play a persistent role in the rest of the 
text. To understand this notion oflogical space, the next set of propositions must be 
considered. 
2. What is the case - a fact - is the existence of a state-of-affairs. 
1 Fogelin, R.,1976, p3. 
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2.01 A state-of-affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). 
2.021 In logic, nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state-of-affairs, the possibility of 
the state-of -affairs must be written into the thing itself. 
A state-of-affairs consists of a combination of objects. These objects must, of 
necessity, be able to combine with other objects. ('In logic nothing is accidental.') The 
possible combinations that an object can enter into with other objects lie in the nature 
of the object. (They are written into the thing itself) Wittgenstein uses the notion of 
space to convey, in a metaphorical way, the idea of an object's possible combinations 
with other objects. Every object carries with it a space of possibilities which are 
internal to the object (TLP 2.01231). The totality of such 'space' surrounding an 
object - that is, the totality oflogical possibilities (possible combinations with other 
objects), make up 'logical space'. 
Wittgenstein' s account of the world is an atomistic one. The world ultimately consists 
of individual objects which enter into combinations with each other to produce change: 
the substratum of change, namely, the individual objects, are not themselves subject to 
change. However, his account differs from classical atomism in that it is not a 
straightforwardly combinatory one2 . That is, Wittgenstein does not seem to be saying 
that all objects admit of the same range of possible combinations (as is the case in 
classical atomism), and thus that logical space would be the totality of possible ways in 
which objects can combine. Rather, and although Wittgenstein does not specifically say 
so, his language seems to suggest that different objects have different ranges of 
possible combinations with other objects. There are different categories of objects 
which combine accordingly. Consider: 
2.0123 If I can know an object, I also know all its possible occurrences in states-of-affairs. 
and 
2.01231 If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must 
know all its internal properties. 
2 This is an issue raised by Fogelin, R., (1976), and I discuss it briefly in the passage which follows. 
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If all objects are the same - that is, if they all admit of the same possible combinations 
in states-of-affairs and thus have the same internal properties - then it seems out of 
place to make special mention of the fact that if one knows an object one knows its 
possible combinations. It would be out of place, since, if all objects were the same, 
then knowing the combinatory possibilities of one would mean knowing the 
combinatory possibilities of all. In the light of this, logical space can be cashed out as 
follows: although all objects admit of possible combinations (all objects can occur in 
states-of-affairs), different kinds of objects combine differently. It is essential to all 
objects that they be possible constituents of states-of-affairs, but which combinations 
they can enter into is 'written into their natures' .(TLP 2.012) Logical space then, 
amounts to the totality of possible ways in which objects can combine, where different 
kinds of objects admit of different kinds of combinations. 
We now have an idea of what logical space is. This puts us in a position to explain 1. 1 : 
'The world is the totality of facts, not of things.' Earlier, we had too little information to 
explain why this is so. Propositions 2 and 2.01 plus the notion oflogical space make 
the issue clearer: 
2. What is the case - a fact - is the existence of a state-of-affairs. 
2.01 A state-of-affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects. 
Logical space, to recall, is the the totality of possible combinations of objects. 
If the world was the totality of things, then the world would have consisted of the 
totality of states-of-affairs (the totality of possible combinations of objects). But, 
proposition 2 tells us that a fact is the existence of a state-of-affairs, suggesting that 
the scope of states-of-affairs is wider than that of facts - that is, facts are only the 
states-of-affairs which exist. There are other states-of-affairs, other combinations 
which do not exist. Only those that exist make up the world. The world then, is the 
totality of facts, not of things. To say that a state-of affairs exists is to say that it is 
actual. Those states-of-affairs which do not exist are possible states-of-affairs. So, in 
the world only certain combinations are actual. But objects admit of other 
combinations. These combinations are the possible configurations or states-of-affairs. 
The totality of such possible combinations is called logical space. In the TLP we also 
come across the notion ofjorm or logical form of the world. This notion, it turns out, 
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is identical with that of logical space: the totality of possible states-of-affairs is the 
form of the world. About the form of the world we are told that it is unchanging. It is 
fixed. (The fixed form of the world consists of objects. (TLP 2.023)). Although the actual 
combinations may change, the possible combinations do not. The form ofthe world is 
not subject to change since the possible combinations of objects remain unchanged. 
The form of the world is the form of any possible or conceivable world. ('It is obvious 
that a conceivable world, however different it may be from the real one, must have 
something- a form- in common with it.' (TLP 2.022)). In any possible world, although 
the facts may be different to those of the actual world, it cannot differ in form - that is, 
any possible world must admit of the same set of objects with their limited and fixed 
range of possible combinations. Objects form the substratum ofboth the actual and the 
possible world. The form of the world is a priori. It is logically prior to all experience 
and all change: it is what makes change possible; it is what makes contingencies 
possible. No combinations can occur outside this fixed form. 
Recall that in answering the question 'How is fact-stating discourse possible?', 
Wittgenstein makes a number of inter-related claims about the world, language and the 
relationship between language and the world. If fact-stating discourse is possible, then 
the world must admit of certain features, language must have certain features and 
language and the world must be related in a certain way. I have already looked at 
Wittgenstein's ontological claims about the world. I now tum to his account of 
language. His inquiry into language took on the following form: 
(i) what is the structure of language?, and 
(ii) what is the function oflanguage? 
He furnishes two accounts to answer these questions: 
(i) the truth-function theory oflanguage, and 
(ii) the picture theory of language 
Now, since he believed that language is the totality of propositions, the questions 
become: 
(i) how are propositions related to one another? and 
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(ii) how are propositions related to the world? 3 
I deal with these questions in tum. 
[C] THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE 
According to Wittgenstein, if we can use language to talk about the world, then some 
propositions must be directly connected to the world, in the sense that their truth-
values are not determined by other propositions but by the world. This led to the 
bifurcation of propositions into complex (non-elementary) propositions and elementary 
(basic) propositions. All ordinary propositions are complex. These can be analysed into 
simpler propositions. These in tum can be analysed into (absolutely) basic 
propositions, which admit of no further analysis. These are elementary propositions. 
Complex propositions are related to elementary propositions in that they are truth-
functions of elementary propositions - that is, the truth-value of complex propositions 
depends on the truth-value of elementary propositions. The truth-value of elementary 
propositions, however, depends on the world. (An elementary proposition is true if it is 
a description of the way the world is- if some feature of the world makes it true). 
Although Wittgenstein was sure a priori that there must be elementary propositions, 
he was unable to give examples of them (since he was unable to perform, in practice, a 
complete analysis of complex propositions). On this matter he tells us: 
The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are. What belongs to its 
application, logic cannot anticipate. (TLP 5.557) 
Here Wittgenstein indicates that analysis of propositions belongs to the application of 
logic. His investigation, by contrast, is a purely logical one, so the question of what 
elementary propositions there are has no bearing on his investigation. 
The question now is: what exactly is the relation between language and the world, such 
that language is about the world? The answer to this question leads on to the second 
3 In Notebooks (p 39) we find testimony to his concern with the nature of the proposition: 'My whole 
task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition.' 
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horn ofWittgenstein's inquiry into language- namely, the function of language. The 
question here is: how is language (how are propositions) related to the world? 
Wittgenstein's account ofthe function oflanguage hinges on an important feature of 
language hitherto not discussed. It is as follows: Propositions (elementary 
propositions) consists of primitive signs called 'names'- a proposition is 'a nexus, a 
concatenation of names' (TLP 3.26). Thus we have the following picture of the 
structure of language: Names combine to make up elementary propositions. 
Elementary propositions combine to make up complex propositions. Complex 
propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Since certain propositions 
must be about the world, these 'names' must somehow be in direct contact with the 
world. The contact point between language and the world then, is at the level of 
names. Names refer to objects. So the contact point between language and the world is 
at the level of names and objects. Because a name is a primitive or simple sign (it is not 
a product of parts), it refers to simple objects (which are not products of parts). Simple 
objects are a logical necessity. We know this a priori. Why? Wittgenstein believed that 
the meaning of a name is the object it denotes. Hence, if there are no objects, names 
would not denote anything. Elementary propositions which are constituted by names 
would thus not be about the world. But elementary propositions are (must be) about 
the world. (Language is possible.) Therefore there must be objects. 
It has been said that the contact point between the world and language is at the level of 
names and objects. However, when we make statements about the world, we use 
propositions. To understand how fact-stating discourse is possible, we thus need to 
understand the relation between language and the world at the level of propositions. 
We need to know what the relation between propositions and the world is. In TLP 3.3 
Wittgenstein says: 'Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a 
name have meaning.' Earlier, however, we saw that the meaning of a name is the object 
it denotes. In the light ofTLP 3.3 we thus see that there is more to the story of the 
meaning of a name. To wit: the meaning of a name is the object it denotes, but it only 
so denotes if the name occurs in a proposition. This correlates with how objects occur 
-we know from our discussion ofWittgenstein's ontology of the world that objects 
10 
always occur in some or other combination with other objects. At this point we can 
see some further parallels between language and the world: for a sign to be a name, it 
must occur in the nexus of a proposition. For something to be an object, it must occur 
in the nexus of a combination of objects (a state-of-affairs). So we have: 
LANGUAGE THE WORLD 
names objects 
elementary propositions states-of-affairs (elementary facts) 
As the discussion proceeds we will come to see several things : 
(i) that the parallels between language and the world are such that the structure of 
language mirrors the structure of the world. 
(ii) that the structure of language reveals the structure of the world. 
(iii) that the structure of the world is going to play a limiting role in fact-stating 
discourse. 
The above points will become evident when we discuss the second horn of 
Wittgenstein's inquiry into the nature oflanguage, namely, the Picture Theory of . 
language. I turn to that now. 
[D] FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE: THE PICTURE THEORY 
The question to be addressed here is 'how is it possible to make statements about the 
world?', or, 'how is it possible for a set of marks on paper to mean something or to 
represent a situation in the world?' We saw earlier that, for Wittgenstein, if an 
expression is to count as a proposition, it has to have a truth-functional structure- that 
is, it has to be analysable into elementary propositions, the truth-value of which 
depends on the world. Propositions are about the world, since their constituent parts -
elementary propositions- are about the world. The question of how fact-stating 
discourse is possible is then more accurately phrased as: 'what is the relation between 
elementary propositions and elementary facts, such that elementary propositions 
represent elementary facts?' Wittgenstein advanced his Picture Theory as an answer to 
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this question: fact-stating discourse is possible because propositions picture the world 
(states-of-affairs in the world). 
To focus on this idea of picturing, let's consider what goes on in a normal picturing 
situation. When a painting pictures or depicts a scene (let's say, using Wittgenstein' s 
example, the scene is that of an accident), then (i) the picture must contain all the 
salient elements in the actual scene (in order to be about that scene), (ii) the picture 
must depict the way things are related to each other in the actual scene. It is not 
enough that the elements in the picture correspond to reality (that is, that each element 
in the picture can be mapped onto an element in reality which it allegedly depicts). In a 
car accident scene, the cars may be positioned in some specific way relative to each 
other. If the elements in the picture are not arranged in the way the corresponding 
elements in reality are, then, despite element correspondence, it is still not a picture of 
the scene. It would only be a picture if the elements in the picture are related in the 
same way as the elements in reality. In other words, they must be structurally 
isomorphic. It must be made clear at this point that because a painting is used here as 
an example of a picture, one might think that a further aspect must obtain for 
something to be a picture of a situation in reality, namely, that the elements in the 
picture must resemble the elements in reality (barring scale etc.). This, however, is not 
a feature of all pictures. A map, for instance, can be used as a picture of a landscape, 
but there may be no resemblance between the elements of the map and the elements of 
reality. Only condition (i) and (ii) are (must be) satisfied. 
Let us now look at how Wittgenstein puts the matter. He introduces his comparison 
between a proposition and a picture at TLP 2.1. 
2.1 We picture facts to ourselves. 
2.11 A picture represents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of 
states-of-affairs. 
2.12 A picture is a model of reality. 
2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them. 
2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects. 
2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a 
determinate way. 
2.141 A picture is a fact. 
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2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate 
way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. 
Line 2.12 tells us in a very general sense what Wittgenstein means by a picture- it is a 
model of reality. Lines 2.13- 2.14 tells us more specifically what being a picture or a 
model consists is: 
(i) The elements of a picture must correspond to objects (in the world). 
(ii) · Elements and objects must correspond in the sense that elements represent or 
stand for objects. 
(iii) The elements must be related to one another in a determinate way. 
(iv) The way the elements are arranged in a picture must mirror the way things are 
arranged in the world. 
From this we can see that the picture theory is two-sided: 
(a) Lines and (i) and (ii) talk about picturing in terms of the relation between objects 
and elements of a picture. The issue here is how the elements of a picture are related 
to the objects in the world which they represent. Wittgenstein refers to this as the 
pictorial relationship. 
2.1514 The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's 
elements with things. 
(b) Lines (iii) and (iv) talk about picturing in terms of the relation between the 
arrangement of objects on the one hand, and the arrangement of the elements of a 
picture on the other. And here the issue is how a picture represents how things are 
related to one another. Wittgenstein refers to this as pictorial form. 
2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way 
as the elements of the- picture. 
Each element in a picture stands for something in reality. And so too with a 
proposition which is itself a model of reality. So, for example, in the proposition 'The 
book is on the table', the words 'the book', and 'the table' each stand for an object, 
the word 'on' stands for a relationship. 1 However, there is more to picturing than just 
the correspondence between the elements of a picture and objects in the world. 
1 It must be noted, however, that taking 'book' and 'table' etc. as objects, is only a way of honing in 
on what Wittgenstein means by his Picture Theory. Tractarian objects are not the objects of everyday 
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The elements in a picture constitute a picture because they are arranged in a 
determinate way and this arrangement depicts the arrangement of objects in the world. 
Now with respect to ordinary pictures, how this happens is quite clear. The elements in 
reality and the elements in a picture resemble each other physically. Take the drawing 
of a face for example. There is a physical resemblance between the drawing of face 
and an actual face: certain of the physical lines of the drawing represent the eyes since 
(allowing for scale, dimension etc.) they look like (an) eye(s). What makes this physical 
resemblance possible is the fact that the elements in a picture are arranged spatially. 
And this spatial arrangement depicts the spatial arrangement of objects of the world. 
The proposition, according to Wittgenstein, is also a picture of reality, but clearly it 
cannot model reality in the way a picture does. The physical marks that constitute a 
proposition do not resemble objects in the world. Moreover, the way a proposition 
depicts the arrangement of elements in a state-of-affairs cannot be the way a picture 
does. A picture depicts spatial arrangement. A proposition does not. Perhaps, one may 
think, the comparison between a picture a proposition is merely a metaphor. One could 
say that, just like the relationship between the word 'book' and an actual book is 
conventional (we could easily have called a book 'tug'), that a particular arrangement 
of elements depicts the arrangement objects in a state-of-affairs is also purely 
conventional. Thus a proposition is like a picture in that both represent states-of-
affairs, the former by being related naturally, the latter by means of a conventional 
relation. However, this is not what Wittgenstein had in mind. The analogy goes further 
than this. What we are going to see now is (i) that the spatial arrangement is going to 
tum out to be inessential to the relation between pictures and the world and (ii) what a 
picture essentially depicts is something logical -that is, the logical, as opposed to the 
spatial arrangement of objects: 
2.182 'Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture 
is, for example, a spacial one.)' 
That is, pictures and reality share logical (or pictorial) form. 
2.151 'Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way 
as the elements of a picture.' 
experience (such as books ,tables, and stones). But since we (and Wittgenstein) cannot give examples 
of such Tractarian 'objects', we use everyday examples just to make the point. 
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Let us look more closely at this idea of logical or pictorial form. The notion of logical 
form can better be understood if one considers this notion in connection with objects. 
According to Wittgenstein, if an object can occur in a state-of-affairs, the possibility of 
that combination must be written into the thing itself These possibilities (the possible 
combinations it can enter into with other objects - its combinatory potential) is its 
logical form. Objects have logical form or exist in logical space. Furthermore, 
according to Wittgenstein, names only have meaning in the context of a proposition. It 
is the relation to other elements within a logical structure that turns a mark into a 
name, gives it meaning. Now, since an object necessarily exists in logical space, and 
given that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes, the logical relations between 
objects in a states-of-affair, and the relations between names in a proposition must be 
isomorphic. The relations must picture or mirror each other. Norman Malcolm2 puts 
the matter like this: 
At 3.22 Wittgenstein says 'Der Name vertritt im Satz den gegenstand.' 
The verb 'vertreten' means to 'deputize for' or to 'act for', so that 3.22 is best 
translated as 'In a proposition a name deputizes for an object'. (Compare this with the 
Pears and McGuinness translation: ' .... a name is the representative of an object.') 
Now, if someone deputizes for someone else, then the deputy takes on the powers of 
whoever he is standing in for. In an elementary proposition, a name takes the place of 
an object. However, an object is not a word (or any other linguistic sign), so it cannot 
occur in a sentence. But a name can. A name 'acts for' an object. Being deputy for an 
object, a name then takes on all the combinatory powers that the object has for which 
it deputizes. The combinatory powers of the name, however, would be exercised not in 
the medium of reality, but in the medium of language. So to say that a name deputizes 
for an object is to say that all the combinatory powers of the object are duplicated by 
the name. Thus the logical relations between objects and those between names are 
isomorphic. It is this logical relation between objects in a state-of-affairs, or names in a 
proposition that Wittgenstein calls logical form (or pictorial form). Pictorial form is 
the combinatory potential of names in a proposition. The following may illustrate the 
issue at hand: a book can enter into a number of combinations with other objects- it 
can be on top of, between, next to, or near to various other objects. But a book cannot 
2 Malcolm,N., 1986, p3. 
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be the colour of something, nor can a book be between its own pages. The latter two 
relations are combinations which are impossible for a book to enter into. They are not 
included within the logical space of this object. Now the word 'book' admits of the 
same combinatory possibility that the object does. (Remember that this is so because 
-
(i) names deputize for objects, (ii) a sign is a name only in the nexus of proposition and 
(iii) the meaning of a name is the object it denotes; objects occur in logical space or 
have logical form, therefore, the way a name is combined in a proposition, it would 
seem, must reflect the way objects are combined in a state-of-affairs. Thus the logical 
form of a proposition supervenes on the logical form of a state-of-affairs. Words can 
be combined in that particular way because objects are combined in that particular 
way). The name 'book' cannot be used as a colour predicate in a sentence. For 
example, one cannot say 'the tomato is book'. Nor can one combine the word 'book' 
with other names to form a sentence like 'the book is in between its own pages', since 
in reality a book cannot be in between its own pages. Thus to say a picture or 
proposition and a state-of-affairs in the world share logical form is to say that both 
exhibit the same logical relations between objects and names respectively. 
An important qualification must be made with respect to propositions and logical form. 
One might get the impression that the logical form of a proposition is exhibited by the 
way it looks on a page - by the way words are arranged in a sentence. 
However, how words are arranged, say, on a page (or in a spoken sentence) reflects 
grammatical form (or surface structure), but grammatical form, as Wittgenstein 
emphasizes in the TLP, is often misleading as to logical form. Consider the 
expressions 'the rose is red' and 'the morning star is the evening star'. Both have the 
samegrammaticalform. They are both ofthe form 'xis y'. However, they do not 
share the same logical form. To wit: the word 'is' has three distinct symbols as its 
logical analogues, namely, the copula, the sign of identity and the existential quantifier. 
This kind ofhomonymity is deceptive. In the first expression 'is' is used to predicate 
something (of a rose), and in the second it is used as a sign of identity. But, though the 
morning star is identical to the evening star, the rose is not identical to its redness. 





Furthermore, we also find expressions which may look or sound different (have 
different surface grammar) but really have the same logical form. Logical form can thus 
not be read off the appearance of a sentence on a page. The logical structure, we will 
come to see later, lies beneath the surface structure. (It can only be revealed by 
excavation- by logical analysis). But more ofthis later. 
The upshot so far is this: A string of words qualifies as a proposition if the words are 
combined in a way which reflects the way objects are combined in a state-of-affairs. A 
string of words admits of logical form only if its combination mirrors the combination 
of objects in a state-of-affairs. What confers propositional status on a string of words is 
that it admits of logical form. 
How far have we progressed with the task of explaining how fact-stating discourse is 
possible? It was said that, for Wittgenstein, if it is possible to make statements about 
the world, then language must have a certain structure and function. The structure of 
language must be truth-functional. Since language is about the world, some 
propositions must be in direct contact with the world, such that their truth-values do 
not depend on other propositions, but on the world. The propositions that are in direct 
contact with the world are elementary propositions (elementary propositions are those 
propositions which result from an analysis of complex propositions). Elementary 
propositions are truth-functionally related to complex propositions. The truth of 
complex propositions depends on the truth of its constituent parts (elementary 
propositions) and the truth of elementary propositions depends on the world. 
Furthermore, since elementary propositions are about the world, one needs to account 
of how such propositions relate to the world. Wittgenstein furnished his Picture 
Theory as an answer. A set of marks becomes a proposition about the world if the 
words correspond to objects (where the words in the sentence represent objects in a 
state-of-affairs) and the way in which the words are combined in a sentence mirrors the 
way objects are combined in a state-of-affairs: they must share logical form. The 
important point here is not merely that they must share logical form, but that a 
sentence admits of logical form in the first place only if its word combination mirrors 
the object combination in a state-of-affairs. Hence the logical form of the world 
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confers the status of proposition on a string of words. In short, the world plays a 
limiting role with respect to language - it determines what is to count as a proposition 
and what is not. Since the totality of propositions makes up the whole of language, the 
world (the logical form of the world) puts a limit on what is to count as language. 
Whatever does not admit oflogical form is not part oflanguage, or, in Wittgenstein' s 
dictum, 'cannot be said'. Thus the limit oflanguage- the criterion ofwhat is to count 
as a proposition- is drawn against the logical form of the world. Only statements 
which admit to a certain structure and function can properly be said to be propositions. 
Only they are part oflanguage. Finally, although the logical structure of the world 
confers propositional status on a string of words, this structure of the world is revealed 
by language. It is only via Wittgenstein's a priori reflections on language that the 
structure of the world is revealed. 
We have seen that Wittgenstein draws the limit of language against the logical form of 
the world. We have noted that language reveals the structure of the world. 
Furthermore, we have seen that the structure of language and the structure of the 
world are isomorphic. Language is a mirror image of the world. In summary: 
Language consists of propositions. Propositions can be truth-functionally analysed into 
elementary propositions. Elementary propositions consist of names in immediate 
combination. These names refer directly to objects. Elementary propositions are 
logically isomorphic with (are logical pictures of) elementary facts. Elementary facts 
consists of objects in immediate combination. Elementary facts combine to form 
complex facts. Complex facts make up the world. Thus the structure of language is 
truth-functional and the function of language is to picture the world. This is the limit of 
language. Language is a mirror-image of the world. So the limit of language amounts 
to the limit of the world. (TLP 5.6 'The limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world.') 
Some new terminology must be introduced at this point. Any sentence which counts as 
a proposition has, in Wittgenstein's dictum, sense. To say it has sense is to say that it 
depicts the logical form of the world. Any sentence which lacks such a structure and 
function lacks sense. Those sentences which have sense admit of a truth-value: they 
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can be either true or false. Those sentences which have sense (which are bona fide 
propositions) are those which can be said. To say anything, in Wittgenstein's system, 
is to depict or to picture or to describe something. To say that a proposition can be 
said is to say that it depicts the logical form of the world (a possible state-of-affairs). 
Now, since a proposition depicts a possible state-of-affairs, and language consists of 
the totality of propositions, the whole of language amounts to a complete description 
of the totality of logical possibilities. 
[E] GEOGRAPHY OF THE TRACTATUS 
To draw the boundary of sense was the aim of the TLP, and was, it seems, what 
Wittgenstein believed was achieved. In LR1 we find him saying that the cardinal 
problem of philosophy is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions (by 
language) and hence by thought - and what cannot be expressed by propositions. 
Elsewhere he says that his main aim is to set a limit to thought - to delineate what can 
be said from what cannot be said. However, although this is true, it doesn't bring out 
or represent the full achievements of the TLP. Despite the impression of a dichotomy 
having been drawn, there really is a trichotomy. There is not merely a distinction, we 
will come to see, between those expressions which have sense and those which do not. 
Rather, the latter category of expressions is further sub-divided into the sense-less and 
the nonsensical. So there is a distinction between sense, senseless and nonsensical. 
In the category of sense fall the propositions of natural science. These propositions 
have truth-value. They are empirical propositions. They can be said. They are 
descriptions of the phenomenal world. In the category of the sense-less fall the 
propositions of logic. A proposition has sense in so far as it is a logical picture of the 
world. Thus propositions, if true, cannot be true a priori, they must be true in virtue of 
the world. But logical propositions are true a priori (they are tautologies, their 
negations are contradictions (T. 6 .1. and 6. 11) ), therefore such propositions cannot be 
logical pictures of the world. They do not describe the world. They do not say 
anything. 'The propositions oflogic say nothing.' (T.6.11). They are sense-less. 
However, they are not nonsensical, for they show ' ... the formal logical properties of 
language and the world.' (6.12)- the limit of language and (thus) the limit of the world. 
1 Letters to Russell, p71, quoted in Anscombe, op. cit., p161, quoted in Fann, K.T., 1969, p22. 
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The propositions oflogic can also be referred to as syntactic propositions, since they 
concern the syntactic aspect of language. In the category of nonsensical fall the 
propositions of philosophy (those of metaphysics), ethics and aesthetics. They are 
neither 'empirical,' nor 'logical'. They are, according to Wittgenstein, attempts to 
transcend, in language, the limit oflanguage, and hence the limit of the world. They 
are not descriptions of the world. Their structures do not depict the logical structure of 
the world (or rather they lack structure, since an expression is only said to have 
structure if its word combination pictures object combination in the world). 
Consequently, they do not say anything. 
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but 
nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answers to questions of this kind, but can 
only establish that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions arise from 
our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong to the same class as the 
question whether the good is more or less identical with the beautiful.) ( 4. 003). 
The point here is that nonsensical 'propositions', although resembling genuine 
propositions in surface structure (surface grammar) do not, as far as their underlying 
grammatical structure is concerned, depict any state-of-affairs (elementary fact) in the 
world. Because surface grammar conceals the underlying logical structure, we are 
misled: we take these nonsensical 'propositions' to be genuine or bona fide 
propositions. Nevertheless, although such propositions do not say anything, what they 
attempt to talk about is, in some way, real. The ethical, metaphysical, aesthetic, 
although they cannot be said, can be shown. Propositions, which attempt to express 
these, are attempts to say that which cannot, by its very nature, be said. 'They are what 
is mystical.' ( 4.115). Although Wittgenstein claims that the mystical cannot be said but 
only shown, he does not spend much time in the TLP indicating or explicating how the 
mystical can be shown. This is perhaps so since, as Fann2 says, his main concern in this 
book is to show that the mystical cannot be said. How then are we to understand the 
idea that the mystical can only be shown? Perhaps the issue can be brought out by 
recalling a remark from Ramsey which, if taken as Fann3 suggests as missing 
2 Fann, K.T., 1969, p33. 
3 Fann, K.T., 1969, p33. 
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Wittgenstein's point, serves to help us understand what Wittgenstein may have had in 
mind: 'But what we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle either.'4 According to 
Fann, this remark ofRamsey's misses Wittgenstein's whole point: the inexpressible 
(the mystical) cannot be said (by means of factual discourse- the natural sciences), but 
can be shown (by music, art, literature, prayer). Just like the logician can, by arranging 
symbols in a particular way, show the limit of the world, music and art, by a particular 
arrangement of notes and colours, can show something (and this includes showing by 
whistling). 
In what follows I want to give a more detailed account of this trichotomy. 
Wittgenstein's primary concern was to draw the limit of language, and since language 
is the vehicle of thought, the limit of thought, and hence the limit of intelligibility. He 
was concerned to show that what we can do intellectually is limited. Since language is 
a mirror-image of the world, by drawing the limit of intelligibility, he has hereby 
drawn the limit of the intelligible. There are things which do not fall within our 
capacity to express or think. There are things which we cannot deal with intellectually. 
We cannot deal with them intellectually because our intellectual powers are 
constrained by what is in the world, firstly, and secondly, by the fact that we can think 
about things because propositions (our language, our medium of thought) are logical 
pictures of the world. But if something is not in the world, there can be no picture of 
it. Language can thus not capture it. It can thus not be thought, or be dealt with 
intellectually. Sentences which attempt to say that which cannot be thought have no 
truth-value: since they are not pictures of the world, we cannot ascribe to them truth 
(conformity with the world) or falsity (non-conformity with the world). 
In setting a limit to language, Wittgenstein distinguished between propositions which 
have sense and those which do not. Since language is a mirror-image of the world, the 
world is hereby divided into the factual and the non-factual. But we have seen that we 
are not dealing with a straightforward dichotomy. Wittgenstein's trichotomy can be 
diagramatically illustrated as follows5 : 
4 Fann, K.T., 1969, p32, (quoted from F.Ramsey, 'The Foundations of Mathematics', London, 1931, 
p238). 
5 Adapted from Peterson,D., 1990, p167. 
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REPRESENTATIONAL LANGUAGE NON-REPRESENTATIONAL NONSENSICAL DISCOURSE 
(SENSE) LANGUAGE (SENSE-LESS) (NONSENSE) 
THE WORLD OF FACTS THE SYNTACTIC THE MYSTICAL 
The TLP advances a philosophy oflanguage- an account of what makes fact-stating 
discourse possible. Fact-stating discourse is possible because language is a mirror of 
the world. Wittgenstein called language the 'great mirror'. (T5.511) (The metaphor of a 
mirror will become useful in articulating Wittgenstein's trichotoml.) But the TLP is 
not merely concerned with representation - that is, it is not merely concerned with how 
language represents factual reality. Rather, it concerns both representation and non-
representation. To wit: in addition to explaining how factual discourse is possible (how 
language represents factual reality) it is also concerned with those things internal and 
external to language which cannot be represented. So the TLP is not thus merely 
concerned with one side of the mirror, namely, the reflection or representation of the 
factual world in language. It also addresses, firstly, those features which are internal to 
the mirror - the syntactic, or syntax - those features which do the reflecting, but are 
themselves not reflected. According to the TLP, we are in the grip of an illusion 
whereby we believe that these syntactic features lie outside the mirror and are 
accordingly reflected by it. We think that syntax is a feature (state-of-affairs) in the 
world. But this is not so. Syntax is a feature of language, not the world. Secondly, it 
addresses the realm of the mystical. This domain is also not reflected by the mirror, but 
unlike the domain of syntax (which comprises features internal to language), the 
mystical is external to language. However, it is not part of the factual world (which 
also lies outside the mirror but is reflected by it); rather it lies behind the mirror. 
Accordingly, it cannot be reflected by it. Thus there is representational language 
which address the world of facts. There is non-representational language which 
comprises the internal workings of our representational system. This inner system of 
language consists of a network of syntactic relations - internal properties and relations 
between propositions - which does the reflecting, but is itself not reflected. It is not 
part of the factual world- of that which is reflected. Syntactic relations concern 
6 Peterson (1990) deploys the Tractarian notion of 'the mirror' to set out Wittgenstein's trichotomy. I 






features oflanguage itself, not features lying outside language. So, for example, one 
would say that logical relations never obtain between facts but only between 
propositions. Thus where there is a logical relation between two sentences, it is 
because of the syntactic (internal) relations between them, and not because of any 
feature of the world. If, however, we attempt to talk about these syntactic relations-
that is, if we attempt to use language to represent these relations in the way we 
normally use language to represent the factual world, we hereby depart from bona fide 
representation. We would fail to say anything. We have not formulated any 
propositions. Such attempts to describe syntactic relations amount to using language in 
a reflexive and non-representational way. To this category Wittgenstein assigns, in 
addition to logical propositions (which, incidentally, he discusses at the greatest 
length), propositions of identity, modality, mathematical propositions, scientific theory 
and those kinds of philosophical propositions which he believes lead philosophers into 
philosophical error. Lastly, there is nonsensical discourse. This category can be 
divided into two. There are those expressions which result from confusions in syntax. 
(They constitute illicit combinations of words for example: 'green ideas sleep 
furiously', or Wittgenstein's famous 'the good is more or less identical with the 
beautiful'. Most of the propositions in philosophical discourse (metaphysics) are, 
according to Wittgenstein, of this sort. The second kind of nonsensical discourse 
comprises those expressions which attempt to say something about the domain of the 
mystical (that which lies behind the mirror- ethics, aesthetics, religion). It is an attempt 
to use our representational system to reflect that which it cannot reflect. The mystical 
is ineffable - it is that which, although real, cannot, by its very nature, be described in 
language. Of these things which we cannot speak, Wittgenstein says we must 'pass 
over in silence. '(TLP7). These expressions are intrinsically malformed, since they too 
combine words in ways which do not reflect any possible state-of-affairs in the world. 
They constitute misuses of language. 
Thus the TLP has not simply articulated a theory of language. It has in addition shown 
that language has limits - that there are things which it cannot represent. It has thus (i) 
drawn a distinction between descriptive and vacuous discourse, and a parallel 
distinction between the describable and indescribable, and (ii) articulated a distinction 
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between the syntactic and the mystical, and in so doing distinguished non-
representational (senseless discourse) from nonsensical discourse. Any sentence which 
attempts to describe the mystical, or which talks of the syntactic as if it belongs to the 
domain of facts, is a misuses of language. It purports to be fact-stating but actually 
says nothing. It is a pseudo-proposition. 
[F] INTRODUCING THE PROPOSITIONS OF LOGIC 
Wittgenstein's ineffabelia can be divided into two, namely, the syntactic and the 
mystical. The mystical cannot be said because it lies behind the mirror of language. 
The syntactic cannot be said because it is internal to the mirror: it cannot be 
represented because it belongs to the mechanism which makes representation possible. 
The propositions oflogic, as has been said earlier, are of this kind. Now I take an 
introductory look at the propositions oflogic. 
Thus far we have seen that logic is not an external feature of reality. Rather, the 
domain of logic is the domain of the syntactic. Furthermore, we have seen that the 
propositions oflogic are not representational: Wittgenstein's truth-functional analysis 
of the propositions of logic shows that their truth derives not from the way the world 
is, but from their structures. The propositions of logic are thus shown to be part of the 
symbolism of language - part of the rules on the basis of which representational 
propositions are constructed. But if they are non-representational- if they tell us 
nothing about the way things are (happen to be) in the world, why would they be of 
any importance? Their value, according to Wittgenstein, lies in the fact that although 
they don't say anything, they nevertheless show the formal features of our 
representational system. To understand how the propositions of logic show, we first 
need to be clearer on the nature of logical propositions. In TLP 4.46 Wittgenstein says: 
Among the possible groups of truth-conditions, there are two extreme cases. 
In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary 
propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological. 
24 
In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities: the truth-conditions 
are contradictory. In the first case we call the proposition a tautology, in the second, a 
contradiction. 
Tautologousness (and contradiction) are, for Wittgenstein, the mark of a logical 
proposition. The propositions of logic are such that, whatever the circumstance, they 
will always be true or false. They thus lack sense: a proposition has sense if some 
feature of reality makes it true (or false) - if it is a picture - but because the 
propositions of logic are true (or false) whatever the circumstances might be in the 
world, they are thus not pictures of the world. The reason such propositions are not 
pictures of reality (the reason they are true whatever the circumstances) is because they 
are constructed such that their sign-combination cancels out all content. A proposition 
has content (represents some feature of the world) if it pictures a definite possibility 
out of various possibilities. Logical propositions, by contrast, picture nothing in 
particular. Given their sign-combination, their representational capacity cancels out. 
To wit: when I assert that it is raining, I am depicting some feature of reality; when I 
say that it is not raining, I am again picturing some feature of reality, and saying of it 
that it is not so - that is, I am negating it. But in both cases I am saying (picturing) 
something. However, ifl put these propositions together (as in 'either it is raining or it 
is not raining', or 'it is both raining and not raining', I fail to say anything in particular: 
what I say in the first part of both propositions is canceled out by what is asserted in 
the second part. Consequently, these propositions say nothing. As Wittgenstein says, 
' •••• 1 know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining or not raining.' (TLP 
4.461) 
But if such propositions don't say anything, are they to be regarded as propositions? 
The answer is in the affirmative. At TLP 4.4611 Wittgenstein says: 'Tautologies and 
contradictions are not ........... nonsensical.' The reason for their not being regarded as 
senseless is that tautologies and contradictions, although they say nothing, are 
nevertheless not illicit combinations of signs: one can construct a truth-table for 
tautologies and contradictions by following the same rules as one would in 
constructing a truth-table for any other (meaningful) proposition. Meaningful 
propositions can be analysed into elementary propositions which picture the world. It 
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degeneracy. But the 'showing' capacity of tautologies does not end with revealing the 
essential features of language alone. Because, for Wittgenstein, the underlying (logical) 
structure of language matches the underlying structure of the world - what makes 
manifest the logical structure of language must - eo ipso - make manifest the logical 
structure of the world. 
The fact that propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal-logical- properties of 
language and the world. (TLP 6.12) 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein's contention is not merely that the propositions show (but 
cannot say) logical form - but that what cannot be said by propositions of logic, cannot 
be said by any proposition whatsoever. The syntactic is wholly indescribable. There are 
two reasons for this. 
(i) An expression is a genuine proposition only if it pictures a possible arrangement of 
objects in the world. Just because our representational system is not an object in the 
world, no proposition can be a picture of it. Moreover, the syntactic cannot be 
represented just because the syntactic is precisely what makes representation possible. 
In Wittgenstein's discussion on solipsism he makes a point which is pertinent here: the 
eye is what does the seeing - is what makes seeing possible. However, the eye cannot 
itseljbe seen precisely because it is what does the seeing. (The eye cannot be found 
anywhere in the visual field). So too with syntax- because it is what makes language 
possible, it cannot be captured by language. 
(ii) Another reason for regarding logic as indescribable is because logical propositions 
are necessary truths (true for all possible substitutions of its constituent propositions). 
Genuine propositions, by contrast, only assert what happens to be true. Genuine 
propositions are concerned with contingencies, logical propositions are not. Therefore, 
the domain of logic cannot be captured by exclusively contingency-expressing 
propositions. 
Thus far the following has been established: 
(i) The propositions of logic, though they do not say anything, nevertheless show 
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(ii) Logic (the syntactic) is wholly indescribable. Not the propositions of logic- nor 
any other propositions, can say anything about it. 
(iii) The disintegration of sense in logical propositions manifests not merely the logic 
of our language but, because logic and the world share the same structure, the 
logical structure of the world. 
However, it is not only via these senseless propositions that we come to see the 
structure of the world. Wittgenstein claims that pseudo-propositions (nonsensical 
propositions) are similarly revealing. The pseudo-propositions he has in mind are those 
which make up the TLP. He regards them as pseudo-propositions because they lack 
sense not on account of being vacuous (like logical propositions) but on account of 
lacking logical structure. (Their sign combinations are not licit - they cannot be 
analysed truth-functionally). They are thus not pictures of the world. These 
propositions are attempts to talk about both the logic of our language and the logic of 
the world. His claim is that the recognition that such sign-combinations are nonsensical 
shows us something about the formal-logical properties of the world. Through the 
recognition of nonsensical propositions, one can come to 'see the world aright'. This 
category of showing will be taken up later when I discuss his account of philosophical 
propositions. 
An important point which comes out of his discussion on logical propositions is that 
the only necessity is logical necessity : logical propositions are necessarily true. But, 
because logical propositions are non-representational, there are therefore no logically 
necessary facts which correspond to such logically necessary propositions. And so the 
only necessity is logical necessity. 
[G] THE PROPOSITIONS OF LOGIC 
In the preface to the TLP, Wittgenstein tells us that the reason philosophical problems 
are posed is because the logic of our language is misunderstood. The implication is that 
if the logic of our language is correctly understood, these problems will not be raised. 
Philosophical problems are the result of grammatical or logical confusions - the results 
of combining words in ways which are illegitimate and hence do not reflect the logical 
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structure of a possible state-of-affairs. We do so (that is, combine words in this way) 
because language conceals its underlying logical structure. To wit: surface grammar 
disguises the underlying logical structure. We are thus misled and apt to make 
mistakes. We combine words in ways which do not reflect the logical form of the 
world. Consequently, such propositions do not say anything- they do not describe any 
possible state-of-affairs. They are thus not true nor false, and consequently devoid of 
sense. They purport to represent something factual, but actually do not. They are, in 
this respect, like statements such as 'the good is more or less identical with the 
beautiful'. However, there is a sense in which they are different to the above 
nonsensical expression. Whereas the above expression is merely nonsensical (mere 
babble), the propositions of logic show or display structural properties of thought. 
They are not thoughts (representations of reality) themselves. Rather, they display 
those features of our thoughts (and hence our language) which make representation of 
the factual world possible. 
Petersen1 uses the analogy of a die or mould for stamping metal cups, to make this 
point: the die is not itself used for drinking. Rather, it acts as the mould which 
determines the form of the cups, and it is these cups which the mould provides us with 
which is used for drinking. He goes on to say that the mistake which Wittgenstein is 
pointing out is that of confusing the function of the die with the function of the cup 
whose form the die provides. But, according to Wittgenstein, it is not just in the area 
of philosophy where these confusions are found. The propositions of logic, probability, 
mathematics, as well as scientific laws and theories fall in the same camp: they are all 
syntactic expressions - expressions which display the mechanism which generates a 
body of propositions rather than propositions themselves. Wittgenstein's concern is to 
purge the domain of the factual from what really belongs to the syntactic. 
I have chosen to examine three kinds of propositions as illustrative of this aspect of 
Wittgenstein's project, namely, the propositions oflogic, the laws and theories of 
science, and the propositions of philosophy. Wittgenstein's treatment of the 
propositions oflogic is, however, not merely illustrative of his project: it will serve 
1 Peterson, D., 1990, p132. 
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later on as a paradigm case showing how failure to understand the logic of our 
language has lead to mistaken treatment of propositions. To wit: logical propositions 
share the same surface structure with regular representational propositions, but really 
differ in their underlying logical structure, and are, on account of this, treated as 
representational propositions. This leads to numerous philosophical problems. 
However, these problems are really just pseudo-problems - that is, problems which 
result from failing to understand the logic of our language. My reason for including his 
treatment of the propositions of science is so as to make more accessible the kind of 
claims Wittgenstein makes about the propositions of philosophy. 
Wittgenstein's treatment of these issues is reminiscent of the Kantian conviction in the 
Critique ofPure Reason: for Kant, much of what we think of as external features of 
reality are actually structural features of the mind through which we conceive the 
world. Space and Time, for example, are not, for Kant, external features of the world. 
Rather they are features of our mind, through which we experience the world. Hence 
Space and Time are not 'out there', they are not features of the world, they are those 
features which make our experience of the world possible. (Since I have introduced 
this comparison, I might just add, for the sake of accuracy, that although the thrust of 
their arguments are similar, there are nevertheless differences. For one, Kant was 
concerned with what makes experience possible. Wittgenstein couched the problem in 
terms of thought, because it is in thought that we represent reality. Secondly, whereas 
for Kant, that which makes experience possible is located in, and contributed by, the 
mind, for Wittgenstein it is logical syntax - a set of rules determining whether a 
combination of signs is meaningful, which make thought possible. 
Wittgenstein' s account of the propositions of logic follow (as just mentioned) in that 
Kantian tradition and stands opposed to what one can call an 'external-feature' 
account oflogic. The following three accounts are representative of such 'external-
feature' accounts: 2 
(i) Psychological account: This account, formulated by psychologistic logicians, Boole 
and Erdman, regard logical truths as truths about how the mind works. They are 
2 Glock, H., 1996, (p198-99) presents a nice summary which I adapt here. 
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descriptions of how we happen to think. The subject of these descriptions- our 
basic mental operations - are determined by the nature of the human mind - that is, 
the specific logical patterns or forms our thought takes derives from our mental 
make-up. Logic, being located in the domain of psychology is thus in the factual 
world. 
(ii) Platonistic account: Platonist like Frege argue that logic truths are about our 
thought and their structures. However, they do not belong to our mental machinery. 
Rather, they are abstract entities existing in a 'third realm' beyond space and time. 
The propositions of logic are descriptions of these abstract entities. 
(iii) The third account is that held by Russell. According to him, the propositions of 
logic are descriptions of the most general and pervasive aspects of reality. 
Propositions of logic provide us with the most general form of facts by abstracting 
(the most general features) from the material features of non-logical propositions. 
Now the most obvious feature which these three accounts have in common is that they 
take the propositions oflogic to be descriptions of something or other. For them, 
propositions of logic are in this sense just like our ordinary propositions which 
represent the world. Hence, their truth-values, just like ordinary propositions, depend 
on the world. Ordinary propositions, however, can be either true or false: if the world 
is as they describe, they are true, otherwise, false. Logical propositions are, however, 
necessarily true. They are tautologies (true in all possible worlds) and their negations 
are contradictions (false in all possible worlds). Nevertheless, their truth-value still 
depends on the world. The world contains logically necessary facts - and it is these 
facts which account for the necessity of the propositions oflogic. Thus the subject-
matter of such propositions lies outside of language, is reflected by language and, is 
that which accounts for the truth-value of such propositions. 
In contrast to this position, the TLP holds that logic is not a special body of external 
facts, whether facts about our mind or about the most pervasive features of reality or 
about a platonic 'third realm'. Rather, logic is intra-linguistic. It is the about structure 
of thought, and hence the structure of our language. Talk about logic is talk about the 
syntactic features of our language. Logic is the domain of that which is internal to our 
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representational system. It does not belong to the domain of facts described by our 
representational system - rather it belongs to the (structure of the) system itself So, 
whereas what I call the 'external view' takes logic to be something which is reflected 
by the mirror, Wittgenstein maintains that it belongs inside the mirror. 
In the TLP, Wittgenstein advances his position by presenting a cluster of inter-related 
arguments which make the same point from different angles- namely, that the 
propositions of logic do not describe some state-of affairs in the world. Out of the 
range of arguments, I have selected Wittgenstein' s treatment of logical constants for 
examination. Apart from being illustrative of his move to render logic syntactic, this 
particular argument is also what kick-starts the whole project. To wit: what 
Wittgenstein calls his 'Grundgedanke' (Fundamental Thought) plays a pivotal role in 
the spate of arguments - and it is the consideration of the status of logical constants 
which is the subject ofthis 'Fundamental Thought': 
The possibility of sentences is based on the principle that objects have signs as their 
representatives. My fundamental thought is that the 'logical constants' are not representative; 
that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts. (TLP 4.0312) 
The importance of the 'Fundamental Thought' cannot be overstated. As Max Black3 
puts it: 'The rejection of logical objects marks a climax in Wittgenstein's inquiry .... His 
entire conception of logic turns on this.' According to Wittgenstein's picture theory, a 
concatenation of signs represent some aspect of reality if each sign can be correlated 
with an object in the world. Any group of signs which do not satisfy this condition 
does not qualify as a proposition. However, the apparent existence oflogical 
propositions presents a challenge to Wittgenstein's Picture Theory and accompanying 
atomistic ontology. To wit: if there are logical propositions, then each item in such a 
proposition must correspond to some object in the world. Typically, such logical 
propositions contain logical constants (the connectives 'v', '&', ':::J' etc. the identity 
sign '=', and the quantifiers (3x) and (x)). There would thus have to be logical objects 
corresponding to such logical terms. But Wittgenstein stands strong in his conviction, 
3 Peterson, D., 1990, p48, quoted from M. Black (1964): A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus', 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p264. 
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as his 'Fundamental Thought' expresses, that there are no logical objects. His solution 
to the problem consists in what Fogelin4 aptly calls a 'disappearance theory' of logical 
constants. His response consists of analyzing expressions which contain logical 
constants in such a way that these apparently referring expressions are simply 
eliminated. But before we take a look at the solution, let's have a look at the kind of 
complications which arise if logical constants are treated as referring expressions. 
Argument from Equivalence: 
Although this argument is used to support the 'Fundamental Thought' (logical 
constants are not representatives), which serves to open the way to Wittgenstein' s 
theory of truth-functions, it relies on an element which belongs to the theory of truth-
functions itself (This, suggests Peterson5, is presumably the reason for the argument 
appearing after Wittgenstein had worked out the details of the theory of truth-
functions). Let's look at the argument. 
T.5 A sentence is a truth-function of elementary sentences. 
T.5.4 At this point, it becomes manifest that there are 'logical objects' or 'logical constants' 
in Frege or Russell's sense. 
T. 5. 41 The reason is that the results of truth operations or truth-functions are always 
identical whenever there are one and the same truth-function of elementary 
sentences. 
Wittgenstein's point here is that iftwo sentences have the same truth conditions, then 
they have the same sense, and hence say the same thing. So, for example, if the 
sentence 'it is raining' is made true by certain conditions (when it is in fact raining) and 
false by others (when the sun is shining and there is no rain), and another sentence 
'abracadabra' is said to be true (and false) under precisely the same conditions, then 
these two sentences have the same sense (say the same thing), depict the same possible 
state-of-affairs. Now, we find that with expressions of logic, two sentences can have 
the same sense even if their logical constants are different. For example p::::>q and -pvq 
have precisely the same truth conditions. It follows then that they say the same thing. 
However, ifwe were to treat the logical constants of'::>''-', 'v' as referring terms, 
4 Fogelin, R., 1976, p36. 
5 Peterson, D., 1990, p53. 
33 
then the two expressions ought to have the different senses. They ought to depict 
different possible states-of -affairs, since p, q, ::::>, -, v would all refer to different 
objects. To wit: the expression p::::>q would depict a complex fact consisting of the 
positive facts p and q, and the relation of material implication. And the expression -pvq 
would depict a complex fact consisting of the negative fact -p, the positive fact q, and 
the relation of disjunction. However, these two expressions have the same truth 
conditions and hence the same sense. They depict the same possible state-of-affairs. 
Given this, then logical constants cannot stand for logical objects. Logical constants 
are thus not referring terms - and there are consequently no such things as logical 
objects. Propositions containing logical constants are thus not propositions in the 
ordinary sense, since in ordinary propositions every sign stands for an object. The 
following questions now arise: 
(i) How are we then to conceive oflogical constants- ifthey are not referring signs, 
what then are they? And 
(ii) What are we to make of what we call the propositions of logic - if they are not 
propositions in the normal sense (depicting possible states-of-affairs), what then are 
they? 
The first question can be answered by examining what was called Wittgenstein' s 
'disappearance theory' of logical constants. This account will show us that the 
propositions of logic expressed by sentences containing logical constants (that is, 
sentences couched in Russel/ian notation) can be replaced by sentences couched in 
notation where such constants are absent, namely, in Wittgenstein's tabular notation 
and truth-function notation. The point here is, given that such alternative notation is 
possible - that we can express logical propositions without using signs which might be 
thought to refer to logical objects- it becomes clear that logical constants do not refer. 
If they did, then eliminating them should have affected the equivalence - that is, 
propositions in Russellian notation would not have been equivalent to propositional 
signs in tabular or truth-functional notation. But they are. 
Let's first have a look at Wittgenstein's truth-functional notation. Normally, the truth-
function definition of, for example, material implication is as follows: 
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p q p:::::>q 
T T T 
F T T 
T F F 
F F T 
What we have here is an expression '(p:::::>q)' and by means of the truth-table we are 
given its truth-conditions. Thus the definition of '(p:::::>q)' is given in terms of its truth-
conditions. Wittgenstein' s move, however, is to present the truth-table itself as a 















The significance of the quotation marks is to indicate that the whole expression, 
including the T's and F's corresponds to the expression '(p:::::>q)' in Russellian Notation. 
Now, given that the left-hand column of the truth-table is always fixed in the same 
way, there is no need to repeat it, and we need only refer to the right-hand column. 
The right-hand column can be written out horizontally as follows: '(TT T) (p.q)' or 
more explicitly '(TTFT) (p.q)'. We thus end up with an expression which is totally 
devoid of logical constants. But the expression (in tabular notation) is both 
conceptually clear and theoretically adequate6 : from our knowledge of (the 
construction of) truth-tables, it is clear that '(TTFT) (p,q)' means p:::::>q (and not, pvq). 
And so: 
It is clear that a complex of signs 'F' and 'T' has no object (or complex of objects 
corresponding to it, just as there is none corresponding to the horizontal and vertical lines or 
to the brackets. -They are no 'logical objects'. 
Of course the same applies to all signs that express what the scheme of "T's and 'F's 
express. (TLP 4.441) 
6 Fogelin, R, 1976, p38. 
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Wittgenstein's tabular and truth -functional notation show that a pictorial view of 
logical constants is false. The thesis that propositions containing logical constants can 
be transformed into truth-functional notation is going to play a crucial role in 
Wittgenstein's conviction that logic is syntactic (that logical propositions say nothing 
about the world but display or show the structure of propositions). The truth-values 
of logical propositions, we have come to see, are determined by the logical structures 
of the sentences involved, and not, as is the case with regular propositions, by anything 
in the world. Logical propositions are not made true by the world - as 'the cat is on the 
mat' would be. Rather, we assign truth-values to such propositions simply on the basis 
of their structure. This suggests that logical propositions are syntactic - that is, they are 
not about the factual world, since nothing in the world determines their truth-values. 
They are not descriptions of any possible state of affairs. They merely display the 
syntax of our language. They display the rules according to which we construct 
sentences. 'pv-p' is a rule which shows that when constructing a proposition it is only 
of the form p or of the form -p. The relation between logical propositions and other 
propositions can perhaps be brought out by considering the relation between the rules 
of a game and the particular moves in a game. The moves are fixed by the rules: the 
rules determine what kind of moves can be made. The moves are like the genuinely 
descriptive sentences we construct in language whereas the rules are like logic - fixing 
the kind of sentences we can construct. 
Directly after Wittgenstein explicates his truth-functional account, he applies it to both 
ordinary complex propositions and tautologies and contradictions (4.4, 4.46 and 4.66) 
and then presents what he calls 'The General Form of a Proposition': 
It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form : that is, to give a 
description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoever in such a way that every 
possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and every symbol 
satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the meanings of the names are 
suitably chosen. 
It is clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be included 
in its description - for otherwise it would not be the most general form. 
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The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot be a 
proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The general form of 
a proposition is: This is how things stand. 
Why does he give this general form now (and not in the earlier passages where he talks 
about the structure oflanguage)? Because now that he has presented a truth-functional 
account of logical constants, he has at the same time furnished us with a truth-
functional account of propositions. We know now that complex propositions are truth-
functions of elementary propositions, and elementary propositions are pictures of the 
world (states-of -affairs in the world). Given this, a complex proposition is then too a 
picture of the world, and, as it stands, it simply describes or depicts the world. It, so 
doing, simply tells you how things are. Thus the logical form which is common to all 
propositions is 'This is how things stand'. If we abstract from the particular content of 
any proposition, they will all have this general (logical) form. 
And thus by investigating the essence of language (its structure and function), 
Wittgenstein came up with essence of a proposition, the formula or code by means of 
which we can identify a bona fide proposition. 
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[H] THE PROPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE 
An important point which can be derived from the discussion on logical propositions is 
that the only necessity is logical necessity. Logical propositions are non-
representational. There are therefore no logically necessary facts which correspond to 
such propositions. Thus the truth-values of such propositions do not derive from some 
feature in the world. Rather, their truth-value derives from the structure of such 
propositions. Necessity, therefore, pertains to syntax. Thus there is no necessity but 
logical necessity. This position poses a problem for another area of discourse, namely, 
scientific laws and theories. The laws and theories of science are traditionally taken to 
be necessary assertions, descriptions of ways in which the world necessarily is - or 
descriptions of features which, as a matter of necessity, obtain in the world. 
Wittgenstein deals with this challenge by denying that they are propositions . The laws 
of science are not descriptions of necessary features of the world. Rather, he claims, 
they are insights about the forms of laws. They are insights into the structure our 
descriptions of the world take. At 6.34 Wittgenstein says: 
All such statements, including the principle of sufficient reason, the laws of continuity in 
nature and of least effort in nature etc., etc. -all these are a priori insights about the forms in 
which the sentences of science can be cast. 
and at 6.32 
The law of causality is not a law but the form of a law. 
The latent idea here is that the way we think about the world, the way we represent the 
world is governed by rules of representation. These rules fix the kinds of thoughts we 
have - the kinds of propositions we assert. They are hence the forms in which 
propositions are cast. What we take to be the laws of nature are really just insights 
about these rules, about the forms which determine the kinds of propositions we assert. 
At 6.35 Wittgenstein makes an analogy between these rules and a net and says: 
Laws like the principle of sufficient reason etc., are about the net and not about what the net 
describes. 
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Thus scientific laws concern syntactic features rather than facts in the world, and the 
point is that the world is not described by such scientific principles, but by what the 
principles provide us with - that is, the world is described by the propositions churned 
out by the moulds which are the scientific laws. Scientific laws are not descriptions, 
they are what provide descriptions. The analogy used earlier1of a die for stamping 
metal cups is directly applicable here. The die (or mould) is used to stamp metal cups 
which are to be used for drinking. The die is not itself used for drinking. It is the metal 
cups the die provides us with which is used for drinking. By the same token, the laws 
are not themselves (used for) descriptions of the world. Rather, it is the propositions 
(the forms of which) the law provides us with, which are used for describing the world. 
Taking the laws of nature to be descriptions is like confusing the function of the die 
with the function of the cup. Just as the function of the die is to fix the form of the cup, 
the function of the net is to fix the form of our thought. It determines the way in which 
we represent the world. And the mistake we make is to project the form of a 
proposition onto the world, taking it to be a feature of the world, when in reality it is a 
feature of that which makes our representation of the world possible. This last point is 
an important one. It's not just the case that the net fixes the kinds of propositions we 
make, but that the net is what makes representation of the world possible. The point 
can be brought out by considering the following analogy. Suppose our only way of 
seeing the world is through spectacles which are tinted green. The world thus appears 
to us to have a green tint. The mistake would be to think that the greenness is a feature 
of the world, when in reality it is a feature of the spectacles which make it possible for 
us to see the world in the first place. 
Wittgenstein' s point is similar to Hume' s treatment of causality. According to Hume, 
that one object causes a change in another is not a feature of the world. Causation is 
not in the world, it is not there as another feature along with the objects. Rather, it is a 
projection from our minds, produced by repeated observations of constant 
conjunctions. For Wittgenstein too, causation is not a feature of the world. But he 
differs from Hume in that, whereas for Hume, that one event causes another is 
1 Peterson, D., 1990, pl32. 
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something we come to assert on account of repeated observations of constant 
conjunctions, for Wittgenstein, that one event causes another is our way of 
representing the world. It is hence 'there' right from the beginning. We do not observe 
the world and then come to assert that one event causes another. Rather, that one 
event causes another is, in a sense, the eyes through which we 'see' the world (or make 
sense of the world). Furthermore, whereas for Hume causality is just another feature of 
the way we happen to think (it is a psychological feature of our minds), for 
Wittgenstein, causality is a pre-condition of thought. It is one of the 'rules' which 
make representation possible. 
Thus the scientific laws which we take to be descriptions of the world are really 
concerned with the rules which we are, in a sense, in the grip of we say that every 
event having a cause is a necessary feature of the world - things are, of necessity, 
organized like that. But really it is not the world that is necessarily like that. Rather, it 
is that we cannot think otherwise. The necessity is not a factual one, but a logical one. 
It is a necessity which pertains to our language (to syntax). The following example of 
Wittgenstein at TLP 6.3611 brings this point out clearly: 
... when people say that neither of two events (which exclude one another) can occur; 
because there is nothing to cause the one to occur rather than the other, it is really a matter 
of our being unable to describe one of the two events unless there is some sort of asymmetry 
to be found. And if such asymmetry is to be found, we can regard it as the cause of the 
occurrence of the one and the non-occurrence of the other. 
Mounce2 elucidates the point as follows. Suppose I said that it won't rain tonight 
because it didn't rain last night and conditions are exactly the same. Suppose now that 
it does rain. I will then have to admit one of two things: either that conditions are 
tonight, unbeknownst to me, different to last night, or that something has happened 
without a cause. Wittgenstein's point here is that the facts can never force us conclude 
the latter alternative. This illustrates the hold that causal thinking has over us. Because 
we are in the grips of such forms of thinking, the events can never force us to conclude 
that something happened without a cause. In the event that we don 't find a cause, we 
2 Mounce 1981, p76. 
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will then take whatever allows us to distinguish between the two events as separate 
events and posit it as the cause of that event. That is, in the absence of finding any 
difference (which would explain why one event occurred and another did not), we will 
resort to that in virtue of which we can say that there are two events and then regard 
that difference as the cause of the one event occurring and not the other. So, in the 
case of the our earlier example, if we find no difference in the weather conditions on 
the two successive nights which would explain why it rained the one night and not the 
other, we will not cease to look for a cause. (Looking for causes is the form of our 
representation - that every event has a cause is the form into which our propositions 
about the world are cast). In the absence of finding a cause, we will then take whatever 
distinguishes the two events as two events (in the case of our example, different times 
of month or year) and then regard that as the cause of the one event obtaining and not 
the other. Thus the assertion 'every event has a cause' is not a description of the 
world. Rather, it is a function of our 'cause and effect' grid. To say 'A has a cause' is 
not to say anything definite about A at all. Insofar as A is a distinct thing, it must differ 
from other things. And, since any difference between A and, say, B can be treated as a 
cause of A, to say A has a cause is really to say nothing at all. The point comes 
through even clearer if we consider, as Mounce3 suggests, an example used by 
Wittgenstein many years later: Suppose we took two seeds from two different plants 
of the same kind, one from plant A, one from plant B. When we plant them, the 
(resultant) plant A differs from the one which developed from seed B. Our first 
reaction is to suppose that there is a difference between the two seeds, it's just that we 
have failed to detect it. However, suppose this happened continuously, without our 
being able to find a difference between the two seeds; what will we conclude? This 
situation is like the one we examined earlier. In that example we had two conditions 
exactly alike, but the one resulted in rain whereas the other did not. Likewise in this 
example, we have two conditions exactly alike (seeds), but the one results in a plant 
with certain characteristics, the other with other characteristics. Wittgenstein's point 
here, as earlier, is that in the event of not finding a cause, we will never conclude that 
there is no cause. In this particular case, Wittgenstein says, we will conclude that the 
cause of the two plants developing differently has to do with their origin : the one seed 
3 Mounce 1981, p76. 
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produced this kind of plant because it comes from such-and-such a plant, the other 
produces another kind of plant because it comes from a different plant. Thus in the 
event of not finding an obvious difference between the two seeds, we will take 
whatever distinguishes them as two or as distinct - in this case their origin - and posit 
this as a cause for the difference between their resultant plants. The two seeds, just in 
so far as they are two, are bound to differ from each other in some or other respect. 
Our cause and effect grid seeks out any difference, even if it means resorting to the 
latter kind, so as to posit one event as the cause of another. Thus, that the two seeds 
must differ in some way if they produce different kinds of plants, is not a factual matter 
(it is not a feature of the factual world). Rather, it is a matter oflogic: we demand that 
every event must have a cause. It is very possible, according to Wittgenstein, that some 
event can happen without a cause, but we will think it illogical. It is not the world that 
is such that every event has or must have a cause. Rather, we assert that every event 
has a cause because we cannot think otherwise. Thus that every event has a cause is 
not a law-like description of events in the world, rather it is an insight into the form of 
a law - it concerns the rules in which propositions about the world are cast. 
Wittgenstein illustrates this point further by using the idea of a net which determines 
the kinds of thoughts we have. He makes the following analogy. Newtonian mechanics 
(an example of scientific theory) is like a fine square mesh across a white paper which 
is covered with irregular black spots. We can describe the distribution of spots by 
means of the net. However, we can obtain an equally accurate description by using a 
triangular mesh. The different meshes are, to use a term of Putnam's, 'different ways 
of cutting the world up' - different forms of representation, 'different systems for 
describing the world. ' 4 
Two points must be noted here: 
(i) Wittgenstein' s position is not one of extreme relativism. He is not saying that the 
facts of the world are determined by the theories we hold about them. 
(ii) The 'net' is not wholly uninformative; though it is the case that the net (the laws of 
science) are not descriptive and so tell us nothing about the world, there is another 
4 Mounce 1981, p78. 
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sense in which the net can tell us something about the world (though not by 
description). 
I deal with (ii) first: 
In TLP 6.342 Wittgenstein says: 
......... the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian Mechanics tells us 
nothing about the world: but what does tell us something about it is the precise way in which 
it is possible to describe it by these means. We are also told something about the world by 
the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of mechanics than with 
another. 
Wittgenstein' s point here is that although the net itself tells us nothing about the world, 
its capacity to provide a complete description does tell us something about the world. 
The distinction he is making here is one between what is said about the world by a 
form of representation itself, namely nothing, and what is said about the world by 
adding that a particular form of representation affords a complete description of the 
world - and in this second case, a great deal is told . In TLP 6.3431 he says further: 
The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, nevertheless speak, however indirectly, 
about the objects of the world. 
For example, say we used a net of exactly circular cells to describe the surface of black 
square patches. In this case no complete description will result unless an infinitesimally 
fine mesh were used. However, the nature of the net plus the fact that it is unsuitable 
for describing the surface would tell us something about the surface, namely, that the 
black patches were not circular, or rather, that they are not of such a shape as can be 
represented by a circular mesh. Thus Wittgenstein is not saying that any net will do: 
some nets are more suitable than others. Consequently what he is definitely not saying 
is that any way of 'cutting up the world' produces an equally accurate description of 
the world: the different descriptions are not on par. Thus Newtonian mechanics and 
Theory ofRelativity do not merely provide two different (but equally accurate) 
descriptions of the world. It may be that what Newtonian mechanics allows us to see is 
less accurate than what Theory of Relativity does. Hence his position is not one of 
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extreme relativism. And so the related point at (ii) is made: the net is not wholly 
uninformative. That a particular net provides a more complete description tells us 
something about the world. 
Earlier on in our discussion on the propositions of logic the following point was made. 
Tautologies, just in virtue of their being degenerate cases of propositions, tell us 
something about the world. And the general point made was that degenerate cases, just 
in their degeneracy, are informative. Now a similar point is made: that one thing is 
more suitable than another tells us something about the nature of that which it is used 
for. And here the general point is that successful cases, just because they are 
successful, are informative. 
Before I sum up, a point of distinction must be made. When Wittgenstein discusses the 
laws and theories of science, his general point is that they say nothing. They do not 
describe any feature of the world. They concern the syntactic and are insights into the 
forms of representation. As an example of a scientific law, he cites the law and cause 
and effect (every event has a cause) and as an example of scientific theory he mentions 
Newtonian mechanics. He makes the point about Newtonian mechanics being a system 
of description by comparing it to a mesh used to describe some surface. Furthermore, 
he indicates that if the net were changed, one would have a different description. The 
point to be noted here is not merely that if the net were changed, the description would 
be different, but that the net can change - as is evident with a change from a 
description of the world by means ofNewtonian mechanics to one by means of Theory 
of Relativity. (What exactly is responsible for this change is not important here, the 
point is that it can change.) However, the point made using the law of cause and effect 
is somewhat different. (Wittgenstein himself does not mention this.) To wit: it is still 
true that if our forms of representation were different, we would describe the world 
differently (the world seen through green tinted glasses will look different to the world 
seen through blue tinted glasses). However, the difference here is that the mesh, or net, 
as he calls it, is not one that we (can) adapt and therefore not one that we could 
change. The law of causality concerns the form of representation, where this form is a 
pre-condition for representation. Such a law is then more primitive, one could say, 
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than the laws of Newtonian mechanics. Although the facts can force us to abandon a 
scientific theory (Newtonian mechanics), they can never force us to give up the 'law' 
that every event has a cause. 
The main concern has been to present Wittgenstein' s view that what we often-times 
take to be descriptions of the world is really something syntactic. And the content of 
such assertions are not features of the world, rather, they concern the pre-conditions 
for representation - the pre-conditions for thought and hence the pre-conditions for 
language. To this end, Wittgenstein's comments on the laws of nature (causality) are 
more pertinent than his comments about Newtonian Physics in making the point that 
the laws and theories of science are aspects of our representational system. This is so 
because the claim with the causality example is that the laws of science concern the 
pre-conditions of representation; the analogy ofthe net however, is useful only in a 
limited way - that is, insofar as it illustrates the point that our descriptions of the world 
are 'moulded' by the net. 
[I] THE PROPOSITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 
The move in the TLP, it has been suggested, is one of purging the domain of 
representational discourse of expressions which really concern the syntactic, and are 
thus non-representational. With regard to the propositions of logic, it was maintained 
that such propositions fail to say anything, since they do not fix any determinate area in 
logical space. Rather, they concern syntax. They show or display the logic of our 
language. Furthermore, what they are purportedly about is not something factual: 
syntax is not a feature (a possible state-of-affairs) in the world. It belongs to the inner 
domain of the Great Mirror - to the mechanism of representation. This mechanism is 
wholly inexpressible - it cannot be described by any proposition at all. But it can be 
shown, by (i) the vacuity ofthe propositions oflogic, and (ii) by genuine (contingent) 
propositions. As for the propositions of philosophy, Wittgenstein says at TLP 4.003: 
Most of the statements and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but 
nonsensical. 
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The propositions of philosophy, we will come to see, are given a similar treatment to 
those oflogic : 
(i) they are regarded as non-representational, 
(ii) they are relegated to the domain of the syntactic 
(iii) what they are purportedly about, namely, essential features of reality, are not 
features of reality at all. Rather they are aspects of our representational system 
(iv) these aspects are wholly indescribable. They cannot be said, but they can be 
shown, by genuine representational propositions. 
This is the short story. I examine these issues in more detail below. 
The notion of philosophy which is at issue in the TLP is philosophy conceived of as a 
discipline which attempts to study the essential features of thought, reality and the 
relation between them. Wittgenstein' s claim is that propositions which purport to be 
about such essential features are nonsensical. In order to understand what he means by 
nonsensical, it will be useful to review his reasons for rendering the propositions of 
logic as senseless. Logical propositions, as we have seen, say nothing. The notion of 
saying is closely bound up with that of sense. A proposition with sense fixes an area or 
situation in logical space. What the proposition says (its sense) is just that particular 
division it makes in logical space. Tautologies and contradictions, however, make no 
such division in logical space. 
A tautology leaves open to reality the whole ..... of logical space: a contradiction fills the 
whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus neither of them can determine 
reality in any way. (TLP 4.463) 
Tautologies and contradictions thus lack sense. They do not depict any determinate 
situation, and thus fail to say anything. However, although they lack sense, they are 
not nonsensical, since, as we have seen, their signs are combined legitimately. They are 
well-formed. Philosophical propositions also lack sense and are accordingly non-
representational - but for a different reason. And this is the very reason for which they 
are rendered nonsensical. Philosophical propositions are nonsensical because their sign-
combinations are illicit. They fail to fix an area in logical space because no object -
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combination maps onto their particular sign-combination. In short, their sign-
combination contravenes logical syntax. 
It is worthwhile to note that for Chomsky, even if an expression is syntactically well-
formed, it can still be regarded as 'semantically anomalous'. In other words, its 
semantic status is not guaranteed by its syntactic structure. So, for example, 
'Colourless green ideas sleep furiously' is, for Chomsky, syntactically well-formed but 
'semantically anomalous'. For Wittgenstein, however, if an expression is nonsensical 
(perhaps the analogue of Chomsky's 'semantically anomalous') it is just so because it 
is not well-formed - because it breaks the rules of syntax. (Remember that he draws the 
limit of language against the logical form of the world - that is, against the totality of 
possible states-of -affairs. If a sign-combination does not reflect a possible state-of-
affairs, it fails to qualify as a proposition - as part of language.) In the propositions of 
logic, signs are combined in just the same way as they are when they occur in a 
genuine proposition. The 'v', in 'pv- p' (a tautology) function in the same way as the 
'v' in 'pvq' (a regular proposition with sense). With philosophical propositions, 
however, words are (have to be) used or combined quite differently. How we are to 
understand this 'different way' in which words in such a proposition are combined is 
intimately linked with what we attempt to express with such propositions. To wit: 
philosophical propositions, as we have said, are attempts to talk about the essence of 
reality. Because of this, words now have to be used reflexively - that is, they have, in a 
sense, to be turned in on themselves and, accordingly, be used in quite new senses. The 
sense in which such words are used departs from the sense in which they are used in 
ordinary (genuine) propositions. Wittgenstein's criticism is that these new 
(philosophical) senses can be given no coherent explanation. If meanings depart from 
ordinary senses, then we fail to say anything by these words. Any attempt to explain 
such meanings using ordinary terms just domesticates the words and demonstrates that 
such a word cannot really have a meaning which departs from its meaning in a genuine 
proposition; alternatively, if we stipulate a 'new' meaning for such a word, then we are 
simply dealing with two different symbols. 
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The bottom line is that language is limited to describing possible states-of-affairs. It 
achieves such a function because its logical form mirrors that of states-of-affairs in 
logical space. Possible states-of-affairs are combinations of objects. The combinatory 
possibilities are written into the objects themselves. The combinatory possibilities of 
objects are fixed. There are no combinatory possibilities outside of these. The limits of 
conceivability are fixed by these possible combinations. Any word-combination which 
is not in accordance with a possible object-combination falls outside language. It 
transgresses the limits of intelligibility. So, because any attempt to talk about essential 
features of reality results in the contravention of syntax, any attempt to talk about 
essential features of reality attempts to go beyond what we can do intellectually. Such 
attempts produce nonsensical expressions, since these expressions are not governed by 
syntax. 
Though the point is a quite general one, the idea that philosophical propositions 
transgress the limits of language (contravene the rules of logical syntax) is best 
explained in connection with the discussion in the 4.12's in the TLP onformal 
concepts. According to Wittgenstein, formal concepts such as 'object', 'number', 
'colour' (ontological categories), and 'name', 'proposition' (logico-linguistic 
categories) in their ordinary language use, function as variables. For example, we say: 
'There are two objects which .... ', which, in logical notation is expressed as '3 x 3 y 
.... '. Or 'The colour is too bright' is expressed as (3x) Cx ..... '. Such words function 
as variables over which properties can be predicated. However, in philosophical 
propositions we attempt to use such words as predicates. Typically, they get used as 
'proper-concept words'. For example, we say: 'Red is a colour', 'Seven is a number'. 
Here 'colour' and 'number' are used as predicates. And whenever such words are used 
as proper-concept words (and thus as a predicates) ' ... nonsensical pseudo-propositions 
are the result.' (TLP 4.1272). So, although one can say 'there are books', one cannot 
say 'there are objects'. According to Wittgenstein, when words such as 'object' and 
'colour' are used as predicates, they can be given neither sense, nor Bedeutung 
(reference). 1 A word or name, to recall, only has a meaning (referent) in the context of 
1 No sense because they are combined illicitly; no reference because the sentence in which they occur 
lacks logical form. 
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a proposition, so, if an expression does not qualify as a genuine proposition its words 
lack referents. 
Now, apart from the mere fact that formal concepts are not normally used as 
predicates, what, according to the TLP, is actually wrong with using them thus? To 
understand this we have to understand the role predicates play in ordinary language. 
We can examine this by making reference to TLP 3. 31. Here Wittgenstein claims that a 
symbol (a sign together with its sense) contributes toward the sense of a proposition 
(makes a semantic contribution). Thus, if an expression is used as a symbol (that is, if it 
is used to make a contribution towards sense) but fails to, it is not a genuine symbol 
and hence any sentence which contains it is not a genuine proposition. To elaborate:2 
take the expression 'red is a colour'. Anyone capable of understanding this expression 
must already know the various uses (combinatory possibilities) of the word 'red'. They 
must already understand that red is a colour (and not a number, say). Thus to say of 
red that it is a colour it to make no semantic contribution to the sentence which has not 
already been made by the word 'red' alone. 'red is a colour' does not say anything. 
Rather, it stipulates a rule for the use of the world 'red', or better, it gives the rule for 
the combinatory possibilities of 'red' (that is, that it is to be combined as a colour-
word and not, say, as a number-word). In the dictum ofWittgenstein's later work, 'red 
is a colour' is an act of naming and since ' [ n ]aming is so far not a move in the 
language game.' (PI 49), one is thus not saying or communicating anything. 'Red is a 
colour' is more like stage-setting: it provides one with names so that communication 
can take place by using them. It's like setting up the chess board and indicating what is 
what on the board, that this piece is to act as king and another as queen, etc. Setting 
up the board like this is not yet playing the game - setting up the board like this does 
not yet count as a move in the game. Likewise, naming is only setting up the stage in 
order for a game to be played, hence naming is not yet a move in the language game. 
Now, failure to make a semantic contribution to the semantic content of a sentence 
renders such a term, as well as the proposition in which it occurs, meaningless. All 
philosophical propositions which employ such formal concepts - propositions such as 
'red is a colour,' 'seven is a number', 'John is an object', 'being red is a concept'-
2 I take this way of setting out the issues from Carruthers 1981. 
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admit of the same defect. The specific point that is being made here is that an 
expression like 'red is a colour' is not a representational proposition, because 'is a 
colour' is already, in a sense, contained in 'red'. (If you understand 'red', you already 
understand that it is a colour.) No semantic contribution has been made in the sense 
that nothing more is added by 'is a colour'. 
This defect, however, is a consequence of a more general objection: in 'red is a 
colour', 'is a colour' has no meaning. That is, in 'red is a colour' we have failed to give 
a meaning to 'is a colour'. To understand this point we need to refer to TLP 5.4733. 
Wittgenstein uses the example of' Socrates is identical' and says that this sentence says 
nothing because we have failed to give 'identical' any adjectival meaning. If a 
proposition' ....... has no sense, that can only be because we have failed to give a meaning 
to some of the constituents.' This general objection derives from Wittgenstein' s 
compositionalism - the idea that the sense of a proposition is determined by the 
meanings of its constituent expressions. ('Like Frege and Russell, I construe a proposition 
as a function of the expressions contained in it.' TLP. 3 .318). The 'compositionalism' 
argument goes like this: the meaning of a name is determined by the object it stands 
for. Objects possess logical form. The logical form of objects is their possibility of 
entering into certain combinations with other objects. Objects, and accordingly, their 
names, fall into different logical categories: 'seven' can only be combined as in, for 
example 'give me more than seven apples', but not as in 'seven is too bright'. The 
combinatory possibilities of 'seven' exclude the latter combinations. When names are 
combined according to the combinatory possibilities of the objects for which they 
stand, such a combination depicts a possible state-of-affairs. If they are not, the 
expression fails to depict a possible state-of-affairs. The reason it fails is that the 
constituent names have incompatible meanings (the objects for which they stand do not 
combine in that way). We have, in this case, mixed up categories and committed what 
inRylean terms would be called a 'category mistake'3 . In 'Socrates is identical', 
'identical' functions as an adjective- but the combinatory possibilities of 'identical' 
preclude such a function. The same point was made earlier ('red is a colour', 'seven is 
a number'), and it was emphasised that such a 'category mistake' amounts to 
3 Ryle's notion of 'category mistake' was inspired by these issues in the TLP. 
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transgressing the limits of sense. To utter such statements would thus be to talk 
unintelligibly. 
In summary, the issue stands like this: the problem with philosophical propositions is 
that their sign-combinations are illicit. They commit a 'category mistake'. More 
specifically, these propositions say nothing because we have failed to give a meaning to 
some of the expressions in them. The particular sense in which we have failed to give a 
meaning to some of the expressions is by using formal concepts as genuine concepts. 
The result of this is that such expressions (formal concepts) fail to make a semantic 
contribution to the sentence, and thus the sentence as a whole lacks sense. 
Why then do we make philosophical propositions? There are two issues which 
contribute toward this. Firstly, we have a tendency to 'talk' about the essence of 
reality, and secondly, we misunderstand the logic of our language. Because ordinary 
language disguises its underlying logical structure, we are provided with a false 
promise that talk of essential features is possible. Thus, we have a tendency to want to 
talk about the essential features of reality. However, if we understood the logic of our 
language correctly, we would see that we cannot engage in such talk. We would see 
that if we attempted to, we would utter statements which contravene logical syntax, 
and we would thus not be saying anything intelligible. (This is of course not to suggest 
that what we attempt to talk about is nonsense, or not real. It's just that we find that 
we cannot put such (shall we say) 'insights' into words. They cannot be captured by 
language.) It might strike one as a little odd that I refer to expressions such as 'red is a 
colour' as 'insights'; one would expect an insight to be more significant. However, the 
examples I have used above, although they are 'insights' according to Wittgenstein, 
are nevertheless among the banal ones. They are insights into the logic of our 
language. Perhaps an expression such as 'language and the world share logical form' 
would qualify as a more significant insight. It is significant because it tells you 
something about the relation between language and the world and how language is 
possible, and it qualifies as an insight rather than an expression in language, since it is 
an attempt to talk about an essential feature of the world. As such it is regarded, 
together with expressions such as 'red is a colour', as failing to say anything. 
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If we understood the logic of our language we would not 'give in' to such tendencies-
we would not say what cannot be said. Rather, we would heed the final admonition of 
the TLP: 'whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must remain silent.' 
At the end ofthe TLP Wittgenstein says (ofthe propositions ofthe TLP): ' ... Anyone 
who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical ... '. He thus designates the 
same status to the propositions of the TLP as he does to those of metaphysics. Why? 
Because the propositions of the TLP, like those of metaphysics, attempt to make 
claims about the essential nature of representational discourse, and in so doing employ 
formal concepts as genuine concepts (for example, 'the world is the totality of facts'; 
'objects have logical form', etc.), hereby transgressing the rules of syntax. There is a 
difference, however, between the propositions of the TLP and those of metaphysics. 
Whereas those of metaphysics are merely nonsensical (although disguised and not such 
obvious nonsense as 'gloocugloo!' is) the propositions of the TLP are regarded as 
elucidations: they enable one, according to Wittgenstein, to see the world aright. The 
propositions of the TLP say what cannot be said, but in so doing, they 'get the picture 
across'. And once one has the picture, one sees that one cannot strictly speaking (that 
is, according to the dictates of the TLP) say these things. This being the case, the 
propositions of the TLP do not qualify as propositions in the TLP' s sense of the word. 
I have said above that the propositions of the TLP say what cannot be said. The 
problem with this, however, is that if certain things cannot be said, how can one claim 
that they have been said? The way to understand this is to realise that the propositions 
of the TLP are really only attempts to say what cannot be said, and as such they don't 
qualify as language. Rather, they qualify as belonging to the category of 'ways of 
showing' that was mentioned earlier - singing, whistling, praying, poetry, art etc. 
Taken as belonging to this category, they are another way of showing, and that is 
probably why, for Wittgenstein, they are valuable. However, if they are (mistakenly) 
taken as saying anything - if they are taken as, strictly speaking, intelligible - they 
become a problem, for then they come to be treated as genuine discourse, and then we 
are tempted to ask of them all the questions that can be asked of issues expressed in 
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genuine discourse. These questions would then be, strictly speaking, illegitimate ones -
ones which are the result of misunderstanding the logic of our language. They would 
be misuses of language, and are not be taken seriously - that is, they are not be taken in 
the same way we take questions in genuine representational discourse. 
Three categories of nonsensical discourse can be identified in the TLP. 
(i) patent nonsense (Chomsky's 'green ideas sleep furiously'). 
(ii) disguised nonsense ('every event has a cause', 'red is a colour'). (These 
expressions contravene syntax and as such are not genuinely representational. 
However, they are not mere nonsense in that they actually concern syntax - they are 
attempts to talk about what cannot be spoken of. They are also not patent nonsense, 
in that it is not obvious that they contravene syntax, in the way, say, Chomsky's 
example clearly does.) 
(iii) elucidatory nonsense. (These expressions (like the ones of the TLP) are 
nonsensical in that they contravene syntax, but unlike the second category of 
nonsense, they are not a display of the rules of syntax, as we have earlier suggested 
is the case with expressions like 'red is a colour'. Rather, they are attempts to talk 
directly about the structure oflanguage. For example, 'A picture is a fact.' (2.141), 'A 
name means an object. The object is its meaning.' (3.203).) 
There is a further distinction between traditional metaphysics and the propositions of 
the TLP. Whereas the former purport to be about the most essential features of the 
world (for example, 'every event has a cause is a feature of the world') but are really, 
according to Wittgenstein, aspects of syntax or our representational system, the 
propositions of the TLP concern our representational system directly. More 
specifically, Wittgenstein's concern in the TLP is to understand the nature of 
representation by coming to understand the nature of the limits of thought (and by 
implication, the world). To echo Kant: 'The ground of the relation of representation to its 
object "constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. '4 Both 
Kant and the Wittgenstein of the TLP were convinced that the only proper way to do 
4 Kant, Emmanual: Kant- Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99,pp71-72, (Letter to Marcus Hertz, 
Feb. 21, 1772), quoted in Stern 1995, p66. 
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philosophy is to come to understand the limits of intellectual discourse - for Kant, the 
limits of(pure) reason, for Wittgenstein (who articulates intellectual discourse in 
linguistic terms) the limits of language and (what amounts to the same thing) the limits 
of thought. As for traditional metaphysics, the TLP objection is that despite the fact 
that it purports to be about the world, it is in fact not about the world. In fact, it is not 
about anything at all, since it does not constitute genuine representational discourse. 
Rather, it displays (in some cases) the rules of our language. (The expressions 'every 
event has a cause', 'objects are extended,' etc. do not tell us anything about the world. 
Rather, they concern the mode of representation. They belong to the forms by means 
of which we represent the world.) The point that is being made here is that although 
both the propositions of (traditional) metaphysics and those of the TLP are rendered 
nonsensical, the former purport to be about the world, but actually concern syntax, 
whereas the latter are a patent attempt to talk about syntax (if only to say that syntax 
cannot be spoken about!). The TLP articulates this concern with syntax (the limits of 
representational discourse) in terms of, as we have seen, the distinction between what 
can be said and what cannot be said but only shown. What unites them, however, is 
that they both actually concern syntax - and it is for this reason that the same criticism 
is leveled against them. They are nonsensical because they attempt to talk about what 
cannot be said in representational discourse. 
It might be objected at this point that, contrary to what I have said above, Wittgenstein 
does not confine himself to talk about our representational system exclusively: he does 
make ontological claims, and quite a number of them too! What then makes his project 
different to that of traditional metaphysicians? The distinction can perhaps be brought 
out like this. Whereas traditional metaphysicians engaged in what one could call 
speculative or dogmatic metaphysics, Wittgenstein's project is an a priori one. 
Wittgenstein's ontological claims are demanded a priori (and so too, he believed, were 
his claims about language): if representational discourse is possible, then language 
must have such and such features. One of these features is that language and the world 
are logically isomorphic. Given this as well as other features oflanguage (that there 
necessarily are simple or primitive linguistic entities, namely, names, and that the 
meaning of a name is the object it picks out, so there must be onto logically equivalent 
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entities to these names, namely, simple objects, etc.), the world must be thus and so. 
The account of the world which Wittgenstein offers is thus an a priori one. Language 
must be such and such, and given the relation between language and the world (a 
relation which he too believed was demanded a priori if representational discourse is 
possible), the world must have certain features. This is not so with speculative 
metaphysics; that is, the speculative metaphysician's ontological accounts are not 
arrived at in this way. 
It is important to realize that Wittgenstein' s concern to articulate the nature (and hence 
the limits) of representational discourse really is just an implication of a more central 
and dominant concern. The real driving force behind his work is to articulate a 
distinction between showing and saying. Wittgenstein's reply to Russell's preliminary 
questions about the TLP confirms this: 
- Now I'm afraid you haven't really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole 
business of logical propositions is only a corollary. The main point is the theory of what can 
be said by propositions- i.e. by language- (and, which comes in the same thing, what can be 
thought) and what cannot be said by propositions, but only shown; which I believe, is the 
cardinal problem of philosophy. -
5 
In fact, the distinction between what can be said and what can be only be shown 
pervades the TLP from its preface to its closing admonishing lines: 'What we cannot 
speak about we must pass over in silence.' And in a letter to von Ficker we read that the 
TLP 'consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is 
precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the 
ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of 
drawing these limits .. .'.
6 Thus Wittgenstein's intention is to draw a distinction between 
what can be said and what cannot be said -from within, that is - by saying only that 
which can be said. Why must the limits only be drawn from within? Because it is only 
'within' that makes sense. (The limits must be drawn in language.) What lies on the 
'other side of the limit' is, as Wittgenstein says, simply nonsense. But the TLP, in 
5 Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore, p71, Aug.l9, 1919, quoted in Stem, D 1995, p70. 
6 Paul Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, ppl43-44. The letter was written in 1919, 
quoted in Stem, D., 1995, p8. 
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attempting to achieve its objective, ends up by itself crossing the limits. The situation is 
as follows: Wittgenstein's intention is to draw the limit by saying only what can be said 
-and in so doing indicate what cannot be said precisely by not saying it. Now such an 
objective could perhaps be achieved by literally saying only what can be said (saying 
only that which conforms to the rules of syntax). What one would end up with by 
doing so is an inventory of all sayable expressions. 7 For example: 'the cat is on the 
mat', 'the cat is not on the mat', 'the dog is on the roof, 'the dog is ... ' and so on. 
The entire inventory of sayable expressions would thus constitute 'what can be said' -
and the limit would hereby have been drawn from within. (An objection could be raised 
to this idea of an inventory: an inventory comes to an end. Only 'so many things' 
constitute an inventory - whereas the list of what can be said is, by contrast, endless. In 
response, perhaps one could say that such a very long(!) inventory would constitute 
better obedience to Wittgenstein's admonitions: rather say less than what can be said 
than attempt to say what cannot be said! It could be argued that by doing it this way 
(that is, taking a go at drawing the limits from the inside- providing an inventory), 
Wittgenstein's point would not be made. By saying only that which can be said 
(providing an inventory), no clear indication would have been given that language has 
limits. So Wittgenstein' s intention of saying only what can be said and hereby pointing 
to the fact (or rather, showing) that language has limits (and that the limits must not be 
crossed) would not be executed.8 However, rather than giving an inventory, 
Wittgenstein wanted to give the 'general form of a proposition' - a formula, or trade-
mark, as it were, characteristic of all genuine propositions. So, rather than having a list 
of all genuine propositions, we would instead be equipped with a formula that would 
enable us to recognize those propositions which can be said. Hence Wittgenstein set 
out to present a critique of language - an account of the essence of language (its 
structure and function). Aformula (rather than an inventory) is what he thought he 
would present us with. And this is just where the trouble lay: saying what a proposition 
(essentially) is involves, as we shall see, understanding (saying or thinking) what it is 
not. In short, saying what a proposition is involves attempting to take an 'outside' 
perspective- a perspective where you can 'see' (and hence say) what counts as a 
7 Holiday, A. (Personal correspondence, 1997.) Anthony Holiday is a senior lecturer in Philosophy at 
the School of Government at the University of the Western Cape. 
8 My supervisor, Paul Taylor, raised this point in a conversation. 
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proposition. But this then amounts to crossing the limits - it is no longer a view 'from 
within'. And, since 'what lies on the other side is simply nonsense', such an outside 
perspective, which is required in giving a general 'formula' of the proposition, 
constitutes nonsensical discourse. Hence Wittgenstein's description ofthe propositions 
of the TLP as nonsensical. They attempt to talk about syntax - the pre-conditions of 
representational discourse - but it is precisely syntax which is ineffable. 
However, although the propositions of the TLP cannot be said, what they attempt to 
talk about- syntax- can be shown by the propositions oflogic (tautologies and 
contradictions) and by ordinary bona fide representational discourse. 
Apart from the fact that the TLP says things which cannot be said - for example, that 
language and the world share logical form, that there are objects, etc. -it is itself 
replete with admonitions against what cannot be said, and these admonitions 
themselves constitute 'what cannot be said.' For example, Wittgenstein admonishes 
against saying that there are scientific laws. If we are in the grip of a scientific law, 
then we cannot say that we are, since this would amount to saying precisely that which 
the law forbids us from saying. 9 Saying that there are scientific laws amounts to an 
attempt to transgress the limits oflanguage. However, such an admonition itself 
constitutes transcending the limits of representational discourse. To wit: saying that we 
are in the grips of scientific laws as well as saying that we should not say that we are in 
the grip of these laws are both nonsensical. If you cannot say that our representational 
system is such and such, then by the same token we cannot say that we cannot say that 
it is such and such. 
Let us have a look at Wittgenstein's admonitions. The following, according to the 
TLP, are among those things that cannot be said: 10 
I. the pictorial form common to the picture and what it is a picture of (2.172 -
2.174). Pictorial form cannot be pictured by the picture; rather, the picture 
displays it. 
9 The earlier discussion on colour conventions make this point; in addition , a more extended account 
of bipolarity, which I will present a bit later, helps, as well, to make this point a bit clearer. 
10 Adapted from Glock, H., 1996, pp 330-31. 
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II. the meaning of signs, and that two signs share the same meaning (3.33ff; 6.23). 
The meanings of our signs are what enable us to talk about the world; however, 
we cannot talk about the meaning of our signs - this is once again, an attempt to 
'get outside' our language. There is no meta-language in which to talk about the 
meanings of our symbols. Any account of semantics already assumes our 
semantics. 11 Semantics is inexpressible, but it can be shown, by ordinary 
propositions. We cannot say that two signs are equivalent; however, that they are 
is manifest in the two expressions themselves. 
III. that a symbol represents an object or a number (4.126). We cannot say that an 
object falls under a formal concept - that is, we cannot, for example, say that red is 
a colour, or that seven is a number ('is a colour', and 'is a number' are formal 
concepts); rather, that this is so shows itself 'in the very sign for this object.' 
'A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, 
etc.) 
IV. the sense of a proposition(4.022, cf2.221, 4.461). A proposition shows its sense; 
propositions show what they say; tautologies and contradictions, for example, 
show that they say nothing. 
V. the logic of facts ( 4. 0312). The point here is that of the Grundgedanke - that is, 
that logical constants do not represent objects. Logical constants can thus not be 
said. 
VI. the logical form of a proposition and reality (4.041, 4.12 fl). Though a 
proposition can represent the whole of reality, it cannot represent what it must 
share with reality so as to depict it - that is, logical form. Rather, logical form is 
mirrored in propositions; propositions display logical form. 
11 See my earlier discussion of a Tractarian response to Russell's comment in the preface to the TLP 
that we can invent another language with a different logic to our present language, one that can be 
used to talk about our present language, and in so doing avoid the charge of circularity). 
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VII. that a proposition concerns a certain object (4.1211, 5.535). If a proposition 
concerns a certain object, then the proposition itself shows that this is so. One 
cannot say that this is so, for this would amount to regarding the phenomenon as a 
possibility, and clearly it makes no sense to talk of a proposition's concerning a 
certain object as a possibility. A proposition 'fa' shows that the object 'a' occurs in 
its sense. 
VIII. that something falls under a formal concept (4.126). (This was discussed 
earlier.) 
IX. that the propositions of logic are tautologies, and that they do not refer to logical 
constants (4.0621, 4.461). That a proposition is vacuous cannot be depicted. 
Rather, it shows itself in the fact that its sign-combination cancels out its 
representational capacity. Nothing in reality corresponds to logical constants 
(4.0621), but this cannot be said; rather, it shows itself in the fact that, for example, 
'p' and '-p' say the same thing- that is, the same state-of-affairs corresponds to 
both. 
X. that one proposition follows from another (5.12- 5.132). When the truth of one 
proposition follows from the truth of another, this shows itself or is displayed by 
the structure of the propositions. 
XI. the limits of language and the world (5.5561, 5.6f, 6.124). We cannot represent 
the limits of the world - for that would pre-suppose an understanding of what lies 
on 'the other side of the limit'. We cannot say the world has this in it, but not that. 
(5.61). To say this would involve going beyond the limits of the world (beyond 
'what is in it'), and, since the limit oflanguage is the limit of the world, going 
beyond the world is an attempt to go beyond language. But 'what lies on the other 
side is simply nonsense', so we cannot talk about the limits. Rather, they show 
themselves in genuine representational discourse and its limiting cases (tautologies 
and contradictions). 
XII. that there are laws of nature (6.36). To say this is an attempt to talk about our 
limits, to talk about our condition, what we are in the grips of (since the laws of 
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nature constitute part of the inner workings of language). Rather, that there are 
laws of nature makes itself manifest in genuine representational discourse. 
XIII. the propositions of the TLP itself(6.54). They are nonsensical because they 
attempt to say what cannot be said, namely, syntax- the preconditions of 
representational discourse. Here too, what these propositions attempt to say shows 
itself in language. 
The above list can be categorized as follows. What is inexpressible includes: 
a) the logical form shared by propositions and what they depict. (The harmony 
between thought and reality is inexpressible.) 
b) the meaning (bedeutung) of signs and the sense (sinn) of propositions. (Semantics is 
inexpressible.) 
c) logical relations between propositions. (Rules of logical inference are inexpressible.) 
d) the logico-syntactic category of signs. (Formal concepts are pseudo-concepts.) 
e) the logical structure of thought and the world. (The limits of thought are 
inexpressible - can only be set from within.) 
The bottom-line here is that the pre-conditions of symbolic representation cannot 
themselves be represented. One cannot think the preconditions of thought, since any 
representation is the representation of a possibility, and the preconditions of 
representation are not a possibility - that is, they are not something that representation 
could lack. Representation is the representation of possibilities. And, if one can think 
or entertain a possibility, it implies, according to the TLP, that one can think what 
would be the case should that possibility not obtain. Now one cannot entertain the pre-
conditions as a possibility- since it makes no sense to 'think' the absence of such 
preconditions. The very attempt is incoherent. For example, one cannot think or 
entertain the absence of logical form, since it is precisely logical form that makes 
thinking possible. Moreover, 'entertaining' logical form really is not doing anything at 
all - there is no intellectual activity outside logical form. Furthermore, an attempt to 
think the limits boils down to an attempt to straddle the limits - to have one foot on 
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either side, but again, what lies on the other side is, according to the TLP, simply 
nonsense. Syntax (the pre-conditions of thought) is therefore ineffable- it cannot be 
expressed in language. 
Up to this point it has simply been asserted that the essence of a proposition is that it 
depicts a possible state-of-affairs - that is, a state-of-affairs which could either obtain 
or not obtain. As such, a proposition is essentially bipolar. What has not been 
explained are Wittgenstein' s motivations for this position. 
To say that a proposition is bipolar is to say that it is capable of being true and 
capable of being false. This contrasts with the notion of bivalence, which states that a 
proposition is either true or false. For example, the proposition 'the cat is on the mat' 
is bipolar, since it is possible for it to be both true and false (true when the cat is on the 
mat, false when the cat is not on the mat). The expression 'the world has logical form' 
is bivalent, since it can only be true (is necessarily true). There are no circumstances 
under which it could be false. Wittgenstein' s conviction is that propositions which 
admit of bivalence and not bipolarity, are not genuine propositions. Why? Some 
historical details are pertinent here. 
The view originated with Frege, who claimed that names and propositions have both a 
sense and a meaning (referent), where the meaning of a proposition is one of the two 
'logical objects', namely, the TRUE and the FALSE. Wittgenstein initially followed 
Frege in claiming that a proposition has a meaning, that is, that a proposition stands for 
(some or other) object, just like names do. However, he maintained that the meaning 
of a proposition is not a logical object (its truth-value), but the fact (a state-of-affairs) 
which corresponds to the proposition. On the bases of this - that is, that the meaning of 
a proposition is the state-of-affairs which corresponds to it - it turns out that the 
meaning of'p' and '-p' are identical: the fact which 'p' picks out is the very same fact 
that '-p' picks out. How is this? The proposition 'p' asserts that something is the case, 
namely, p. The proposition '-p' asserts that something is not the case, namely, p. Thus 
a proposition and its negation pick out the same state-of-affairs, since the fact that 
makes it true it the very same fact that makes it false. What 'p' depicts is the self-same 
thing which '-p' depicts, only '-p' asserts that this is not how things are. Thus to 
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understand a proposition is to understand what it depicts in its positive and negative 
sense. 
It can now be seen why, on this account, essential features cannot be represented. 
Consider the expression 'the world has logical form'. If this is a genuine proposition, 
then it must pick out a state-of -affairs which, although it does in fact obtain, need not 
obtain (that is, it must pick out a situation the negation of which is possible). But this 
is not so with the sentence in question. One cannot (sensibly) negate 'the world has 
logical form', since the negation does not present a conceivable or genuine possibility. 
That is, a world that lacks logical form is not a world (in the Tractarian sense) at all. 
Logical form is a precondition of sense: to talk of a world that lacks logical form is to 
talk incoherently. A world that lacks logical form is not a recognizable (describable) 
world at all. The essential feature of a proposition is that it picks out a situation that 
need not obtain. Essential features are necessary features. Hence their denial does not 
pick out a genuine possibility. It allegedly picks out a situation where the necessary 
features (the preconditions) are absent- which is, as I've said, an unintelligible 
situation. Thus propositions which talk of essential features are not genuine 
propositions. 
One may hone in on the issue further by thinking about it like this. Think of logical 
space (the domain of intelligibility) as the area inside a square. Now think of a state-of-
affairs- say, a cat on a mat- as a point in logical space. To say that a cat is on the mat 
is like throwing a net over that area (that is, a determinate area) in logical space. 
However, if you were to assert a necessary statement (a statement which makes a 
claim which is true in all possible situations) you would, in effect, be casting your net 
over the whole of logical space. And what you hereby rule out is, in a manner of 
speaking, what lies on the 'outside' of the logical space. However, as has been 
explained, the idea of something lying on the 'outside' oflogical space is unintelligible. 
But of course one cannot rule out the unintelligible, because the unintelligible is the 
unthinkable. (It is not that one cannot in the sense that one is unable to; rather, the 
point is that it is incoherent to talk of 'ruling out the unintelligible.') What lies on the 
other side oflogical space is just nonsense, or rather, talk of what lies on the other side 
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is just nonsense. So, because what a proposition like this rules out is not conceivable, 
we cannot, according to Wittgenstein, be said to conceive of what it asserts. When we 
cast the net over the whole oflogical space, when we cast our net over all possibilities, 
we cannot be said to be truly representing. The idea here seems to be that to conceive, 
to make sense of, necessarily involves identifying something out of a range, or, in a 
manner of speaking, against a background of something else - of something 'other than 
it'. A case can be made for this idea as follows. Ifl identify, say, a chair in my room, in 
so doing I differentiate it from other objects in my room. I deploy individuation 
criteria, criteria which separate or distinguish my chair from other objects in my room. 
This is the only way in which I can pick my chair out. So, differentiation or 
distinguishing always takes place from amongst what the differentiated is not - that is, 
by distinguishing something from what it is not. To pick out anything is to pick out one 
thing rather than another. But if no such thing is going on- that is, if I'm not picking 
out one thing rather than another, or ifl'm not picking out one thingfrom amongst 
others - then I cannot be said to be picking out (anything) at all. The idea is like this. I 
can only talk of' day' by contrast with 'night'. The notion of' day' only makes sense if 
it can be distinguished from something which is 'other' than 'day'. It would not make 
sense to say that I understand the notion of'day', but I don't understand the notion of 
'night'. (Another example is that one cannot be said to understand 'here' if one cannot 
understand 'there'.) The point then is that making sense always involves a contrasting 
background. By 'contrasting background' I mean an understanding ofwhat something 
is not. Now, when the net is cast over the whole oflogical space (as is the case with a 
necessary proposition) no such background or contrast is present. There is no such 
thing as picking out this rather than that going on. Why not? Because what lies on 'the 
other side' is simply nonsense- unintelligible. Casting the net over the whole of logical 
space is like claiming to have made sense of 'here' without at all understanding the 
notion of 'there.' In summary, philosophical propositions are non-representational 
because they make claims about essential features of reality. Such claims are 
characteristically 'necessary' claims. However, a 'necessary' claim does not rule out a 
genuine possibility, and therefore does not count as a genuine proposition. What are 
regarded by traditional philosophy as essential features of the reality, Wittgenstein 
takes to be not features of reality at all; rather these features belong to the pre-
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conditions of sense. (A statement like 'objects are extended' which may be taken by 
traditional philosophers as a statement about the essential nature of objects, will be 
regarded by Wittgenstein as an aspect of syntax - a rule governing the combinatory 
possibilities of the words 'objects' and 'extended'. 
The point here is that language cannot state necessary features, since the denial of such 
a statement does not constitute a conceivable situation. The propositions of 
philosophy, those oflogic and the laws and theories of science are such attempts - and 
consequently fail to be representational. Language can only state contingencies. The 
propositions above, however, are attempts to state what cannot be otherwise. 
In the opening paragraphs of Philosophical Remarks 12 Wittgenstein tries to explain the 
reasons why the rules reflecting syntax cannot be said. He discusses the issue in terms 
of 'grammatical conventions of colour words'. He says: 
If I could describe the point of grammatical conventions by saying that they are made 
necessary by certain properties of the colours (say), then that would make the conventions 
superfluous, since in that case I would be able to say precisely that which the conventions 
exclude my saying. 
The point here is that any attempt to justify a rule must appeal to some contingent 
state-of-affairs (a state-of-affairs which could be otherwise). But if that is the case, 
then the rules become superfluous. The rules are supposed to prohibit certain kinds of 
expression- they are supposed to tell you which kinds of expressions are well-formed 
and which kinds are not. However, if what justifies the rules is some contingent state-
of-affairs, then precisely that which the rules prohibit as sayable can be said. Recall that 
in a genuine bipolar proposition, its assertion rules out a conceivable situation. 
12 Philosophical Remarks $4, quoted in Stem,l995, p44. 
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If a bipolar proposition 'justifies' a rule, then its assertion must rule out a situation 
which is conceivable. But given the function of the rules, it turns out that the rules will 
rule out as conceivable precisely what the justification implies is conceivable. The rules 
thus lose their prohibitory function. With regard to colour propositions, the convention 
permits, say, 'reddish-blue', but not 'reddish-green' .13 According to Wittgenstein any 
attempt to justify this would render the conventions superfluous. Why? Any 
justification would, according to Wittgenstein, have to appeal to the properties of 
colours. However, since it is conceivable that the colours lack these properties 
(colours having certain properties are contingent states-of-affairs), precisely that which 
the conventions prohibit would then be conceivable. The conventions would not act as 
grammatical rules. The general point is that because language can only state 
contingencies, any attempt to justify what is taken to be a necessity would itself be a 
contingent statement. The rules of language, because they are necessary, therefore 
cannot be accounted for. Furthermore, any attempt to account for the rules must be 
expressed in a contingent proposition, the denial of which constitutes a genuine 
possibility. But this possibility is what the rule is supposed to rule out. Rules can 
therefore not be accounted for. In Wittgenstein's Lectures14 we read: 
Language can express one method of projection as opposed to another. It cannot express 
what cannot be otherwise ... what is essential to the world cannot be said about the world for 
then it could be otherwise, as any proposition can be negated. 
However, although such necessity (syntax) cannot be stated, that the rules are 
necessary expresses itself in the (linguistic) rules that certain expressions are 
permissible and others not. The immediate consequence of the claim that syntax cannot 
be accounted for - that we cannot say what linguistic rules are in virtue of- is that any 
attempt at a theory of meaning is impossible- in principle. That which makes meaning 
possible cannot be the subject on investigation, since such an investigation would 
constitute, on Wittgenstein' s grounds, meaningless discourse - an attempt to transcend 
the bounds of sense. 
13 I take this example from Stern, 1995. 
14 Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-1932, 1930, p34, quoted in Stern, 1995, p45. 
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In his introduction to the TLP Russell15 suggests a way out of this impasse. He 
maintains that the kind of problem Wittgenstein indicates only arises for someone who 
attempts to account for the logic of his language in that very language. The way out of 
this, Russell suggests, is to construct a meta-language- a language which admits of a 
different logic to that of the object language, and which is to be used to talk about the 
object-language. The propositions of the meta-language, because they conform to 
different rules, would admit of senses. So whatever one said in this language about the 
object-language would quality as meaningful. But Wittgenstein would never accept 
this. Talk of a meta-language, according to Wittgenstein, fails to appreciate the heart 
of the issue. To wit: any language one could construct must conform to certain rules-
the same rules. The notion of syntax Wittgenstein was dealing with was much more 
primitive than Russell understood it to be. Wittgenstein's use of syntax was not 
language-specific, differing from language to language. It refers to the very mode of 
representation - any representation. It is the very possibility of representation. Any 
logics which one could construct must conform to these logical rules. These rules are 
the preconditions of thought. Any expression which fails to conform to these rules 
does not count as language. Thus these rules are the rules for any meaningful language. 
So a 'meta-language', if it qualifies as a language at all, will not differ in logic from the 
object language - in which case it isn't a 'meta-language' such as Russell had in mind. 
Russell's solution thus does not work. Syntax cannot be stated in any language. 
Wittgenstein's denial that a meta-logic is possible does not (merely) rest dogmatically 
on the claim that there is just one logic which counts as the pre-condition of 
intelligibility. In Philosophical Grammar16 we find him saying that logic determines 
what is necessary- there is no meta-logic which makes logic necessary. He supports 
this claim with a regress argument: If it were possible to account for the necessity of 
logic in some meta-logic (that is, iflogic could be grounded in some meta-logic), then 
that only postpones the problem; for we would have the selfsame problem with such a 
meta-language: what grounds this logic? The situation would thus lead to an infinite 
regress. We would end up with, as he claims in Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics17, an 'infinite hierarchy' of meta-languages. Furthermore, any artificial 
15 Russell, B., (introduction to 1LP), translated by Pears, D.F. and McGuinness, B.F., 1974. 
16 Philosophical Grammar, pp 126-7, quoted in Glock, H., 1996, p245. 
17 Lectures on the Foundations ofMathematics {14), quoted in Glock, H., 1996, p246. 
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language draws on ordinary language to clarify (at least some of) its expressions. If a 
language were not translatable in this way - that is, if all its concepts or expressions 
were such that they were not (or couldn't be) cashed out in ordinary language- a 
multitude of problems would arise. For one, if ordinary language is, as it surely is, the 
only language we 'find ourselves with', how do we gain access to such a wholly 
untranslatable language? Secondly, and importantly, such an idea inherits all the 
objections Wittgenstein levels against the idea of a 'Private Language' in the PI -a 
private language there being a radically untranslatable language. Glock18 puts the 
matter succinctly: ordinary language is the semantic bedrock, and there is no semantic 
exit from this language - not upwards via a hierarchy of meta-languages, nor 
downward to reality (I think he has 'ostensive definitions' in mind here). And in the PI 
120 we find Wittgenstein saying: 
When I talk about language ... I must speak the language of everyday. Is this language 
somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? Then how is another one to be 
constructed? - And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we 
have! In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of 
preparatory provisional one) ..... 
The point is thus clear: ordinary language is all we've got. Any move that we make is 
via this language. There can be nothing more basic nor more sophisticated than this. 
Wittgenstein levels the same criticism against any attempt to do meta-mathematics 
(that is, any attempt to provide foundations for mathematics, as Frege and Russell 
attempted). In RFM19, for instance, we find him commenting on any attempt to 
ground mathematics in a more basic calculus. He says that 'they are no more the 
foundation of mathematics for us than the painted rock is the support of a painted 
tower.' ( It appears that what Wittgenstein means here is that a painted rock appears 
to support a painted tower, but because it is merely part of a painting, there is no real 
support going on. In the same way, a more basic calculus may appear to do the job of 
grounding or supporting mathematics, but there is no real support going on. I suppose 
one could also say that, just as in the case of the painting, where a painted tower -
18 Glock, H., 1996, p246. 
19 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (378), quoted in Glock, H.,1996, p244. 
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because it is part of a painting - does not stand in need of the support it appears to be 
getting (from the painted rock), so it is with mathematics too. It does not stand in need 
of the support that one thinks one is giving it by means of a more basic calculus.) 
Intelligibility is limited to picturing contingent states-of-affairs. Syntax can thus not be 
expressed in representational language. The question then arises: if this is so, how then 
does one understand logic? (If conceivability is limited to the representation of possible 
states-of-affairs, and syntax cannot be represented, how do we grasp or latch on to 
syntax?) Wittgenstein's insistence that syntax cannot be represented is based on the 
conviction that our grasp of syntax is radically different from our grasp of objects or 
states-of-affairs: understanding syntax and understanding contingent propositions 
involve two radically different kinds of activities - so different, in fact, that the 
difference cannot even, as Stem20 suggests, be captured by a categorical distinction. 
What is meant by 'categorical distinction' can be explained in the following way. Take 
two disciplines, geography and biology. These two differ in subject-matter- they deal 
with different domains of reality. Geography describes the natural features of the 
surface of the earth~ biology deals with living organisms and the structure and life of 
plants and animals. The kind of intellectual appreciation required to understand biology 
is the same as that required to understand geography. Now compare biology, on the 
one hand, and music, on the other. When one listens to music one is doing something 
very different from when one reads a sentence in biology, or when one entertains a 
biological fact. Two different intellectual appreciations are involved. Thus the two are 
not distinguished in terms of subject-matter; rather, the difference between them is in 
terms of intellectual capacity. This distinction is categorical- you are engaged in 
different sorts of activity. Now when Wittgenstein insists that there is a difference in 
our grasping oflogical form on the one hand and our grasping of facts on the other, 
the distinction he has in mind is, as Stem emphasises, even more radical than a 
categorical one. It is a distinction between what can be said and what cannot be said at 
all. So the difference between our grasp of logic and our grasp of facts is not a 
difference in intellectual appreciation (as with biology and music). Rather, there is, in a 
sense, no intellectual appreciation of logic. Syntax cannot be thought. Our grasp of 
20 Stem, D., 1995, p47. 
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syntax is not an intellectual activity at all. When we listen to music (or do biology) we 
are attending to some or other phenomena (albeit in different ways). Not so with our 
grasp of syntax. 
But if our grasp of syntax is not an intellectual activity at all, what does it consist in? 
Wittgenstein's answer is that although syntax cannot be said (that is, described or 
conceived of), it can be shown, and is grasped by our 'seeing' it- not as one 
'phenomenon' amongst others, but in our conceiving of some possible state-of-affairs. 
(I have already discussed the notion of showing in connection with the propositions of 
logic. I intend here to re-state some points made earlier for the sake of elaborating on 
them in the context of a more general discussion of the notions of showing, syntax and 
those propositions that concern syntax - namely, logic, metaphysics, and the laws and 
theories of science.) 
The distinction between saying and showing can be brought out more strongly by 
considering the role Space and Time (and Forms of Judgement) play in the work of 
Kant. Space and Time are, for Kant, the pre-conditions of experience. They are not 
objects of experience. We do not experience Space and Time; rather, we experience in 
Space and Time. Space and Time are not objects (or states-of-affairs) in the world. 
Rather, they are the mode of experiencing objects. But why can we not experience 
Space and Time although we experience in Space and Time? According to the TLP, 
when one understands that something is the case, one hereby also understands what is 
not the case. One can only be said to understand 'the cat is one the mat' if one can 
make sense of 'the cat is not on the mat'. As we have seen, the idea is that a 
proposition can be said to pick out a conceivable state-of-affairs if its negation is also 
conceivable. The reason why Space and Time cannot be experienced (or thought) is 
because we cannot pick them out as a states-of-affairs amongst other state-of-affairs. 
Since we are in the grip of conceiving in Space and Time, non-Space and non-Time are 
nothing: we cannot think non-Space and non-Time. And for this reason we cannot be 
said to (be able to) think Space and Time. We cannot think it because we cannot 
distinguish it from non-Space and non-Time. The important point being made here is 
as follows. The fact that we cannot be said to distinguish Space and Time from non-
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Space and non-Time means that our grasp of Space and Time is not a matter of 
distinguishing anything at all. To make the same point about syntax: understanding or 
grasping syntax isn 't a matter of conceiving or thinking or representing or 
distinguishing anything at all. Our grasping of syntax is an altogether different affair. 
The rules governing our language cannot be represented because it doesn't make sense 
to talk of distinguishing them from anything else. Anything which fails to embody these 
rules is meaningless. We thus cannot say what the rules of our language are because 
we cannot conceive 'non-rules'. 'Non-rules' are unintelligible. And the reason 'non-
rules' are unintelligible is because we are 'in the grip' of the rules. With respect to the 
notions of Space and Time again: although Space and Time cannot be represented, 
they can, nevertheless be shown in our thoughts about the world. That we represent or 
experience in Space and Time can be seen in our thinking about, or understanding, say 
'the cat is on the mat'. But our 'seeing' Space and Time is not like our seeing the cat 
on the mat. It is not a matter of distinguishing one thing from amongst others. It is not 
something we think about, or reflect on - it is not an object of our thoughts. Rather, it 
is just present in our thinking about this or that. We grasp it in our grasping that the 
cat is on the mat. The matter can be brought out by some reflections on our visual 
field, where by visual field I mean whatever it is possible for me to see.Z1 I cannot 
represent my visual field, for then I would have to see it as one thing amongst others. I 
would have to be able to distinguish my visual field from what is not my visual field. 
However, my visual field is all I've got. (What is in my visual field is all I can, in 
principle see). Any discriminations I make are made in my visual field. Ifl were to 
represent my visual field I would have to see it, as well as what is not my visual field. 
But it doesn't make sense to talk of my seeing what is not in my visual field- my visual 
field is just the scope of my seeing. In fact, it is even misleading to talk this way. It 
gives the impression that there is something which lies beyond my visual field. But, the 
point is rather that the term 'visual field' applies, or is limited to, my seeing. It thus 
doesn't make sense to talk of something lying 'outside' my visual field. And, my grasp 
of my visual field is not like my grasp of something in my visual field (my cat) - its a 
different kind of grasping altogether. It is somehow just 'there ' in my grasping of my 
cat. 
21 I do not mean possible for me to see at any one time, but possible in principle for me to see. 
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The point can be made less abstract by considering again what Wittgenstein says about 
formal concepts. We cannot say or think that seven is a number, because seven's not 
counting as a number is not a genuine possibility (bipolarity again). But, that seven is a 
number is shown, and can be seen in certain kinds of expressions - expressions where 
seven is used as a number. Ifl said 'there are less than seven apples', I can properly be 
said to be representing a possible state-of-affairs. However, in my thinking this 
possibility, I grasp (I already understand) that seven is a number. My grasping that 
seven is a number makes it possible for me to grasp that there are so many apples. But 
the two 'graspings' are of a different kind. In the one case I am representing or 
thinking a possible state-of-affairs, in the other, I am not representing or thinking 
(something) at all. We cannot grasp or think that which makes (a particular thought, 
(or rather, Thought) possible, because we are limited by what makes thought possible, 
to thinking certain things. If our thought is limited to 'a,b,c,' -but '0, a' makes 
thought possible, then of course we cannot think '0, a' precisely because we are 
limited to 'a,b,c,' and only 'a,b,c.' If thought is limited by '0, a,' to 'a,b,c,' then '0, a' 
counts as nonsense - or rather the thought that '0, a', counts as nonsense. It is 
unintelligible. Furthermore, if we could think '0, a', there would in tum be something 
in virtue of which that was possible, and so on, ad infinitum. Thinking would thus not 
get off the ground. 
What I have been discussing can be summarised as follows. Metaphysical propositions 
are non-representational. They say nothing because they lack sense. And they lack 
sense because their sign-combinations lacks logical form - that is, their sign-
combinations contravene syntax. The motivation behind such putative propositions 
derives from an urge to talk about the 'essential' or 'necessary' features of reality. 
However, what such utterances amount to are not descriptions of any sort. Rather, 
they are insights into the inner workings oflanguage. The characteristic feature of such 
attempts is that formal concepts are used as genuine concepts. This is the specific 
sense in which such utterances contravene syntax (they are not mere babble). We have 
discussed, furthermore, that what these utterances in fact concern, namely, syntax, 
cannot at all be represented. Syntax is wholly unintelligible (unrepresentational). The 
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reason for this is that any attempt to represent syntax will lack bipolarity. To wit: 
attempted talk of syntax does not exclude a genuine possibility - what it rules out does 
not fall within logical space. 
What I want to do now is examine the reason why logical form cannot be represented 
by presenting a parallel discussion on the ineffability of (what Wittgenstein calls) the 
'metaphysical subject'. (I will use 'MS' as an abbreviation for 'metaphysical subject'). 
The connection between the two issues is as follows. Any attempt to give an account 
of syntax is like an attempt to give an account ofthe MS. And, we shall see, neither 
works for pretty much the same reasons. More specifically, what I want to do is 
twofold. Firstly, I want to motivate the claim that in the TLP the metaphysical subject 
is identical to language. Schlossberger (in his article 'The Self in Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus')22 has important things to say on this topic, and I take a look at his paper. 
Secondly, I want to look at why, according to the TLP, the MS is ineffable. This 
discussion is intended to bolster the contention that syntax is ineffable. 
In the TLP Wittgenstein makes several claims about the MS, of which I list a few 
below:23 
A In a sense, there is no subject. 
B. In a sense, there is a subject. 
C. The subject is not in the world. 
D. The subject is the limit of the world. 
E. The subject does not think or entertain ideas. 
F. The relation of the self(subject) to the world is analogous to that of the eye and the 
visual field. 
G. In some sense the subject and the world are one and the same. 
We already know that Wittgenstein talks about both the MS and language as being 
limits of the world. And we have also seen that the sense in which language limits the 
22 Schlossberger, E., pl42 in Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought, ed. E. 
Leinfellner, 1978. 
23 I take this list from Schlossberger, E. (his list is longer; I only list what is going to be relevant to my 
discussion). 
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world is that language fixes what counts as the world. Language, according to the 
TLP, is not merely a set of symbols which only come to life in the context of a 
linguistic community (as, we will see, is claimed in the PI). Rather, language is signs 
that signify. The power of language to represent is built into language itself Language 
is at once a 'point of view'. And this is the sense in which language is a limit of the 
world: being a 'point of view', language determines what counts as world. In our 
earlier discussions the point was made that the meaningfulness of language derives 
from its possessing logical form. It is in virtue of an expression's possessing logical 
form that it counts as a genuine representational proposition. However, putting the 
matter this way does not properly bring out the sense in which language is a point of 
view. Schlossberger makes the point like this. Language- a picture- 'reaches up' to 
reality (2.1511 ); language projects reality. Language, in short, is intentional. 
Let us now consider a feature of picturing. In his book Reason Truth and History 
Hilary Putnam24 poses the question whether the figure which a colony of ants happen 
to have produced while crawling through a sand patch, and which happens to resemble 
Winston Churchill, is to be taken as a picture of Churchill. His answer is in the 
negative. It would only be a picture of Churchill if, in addition to some form of 
resemblance, someone had intended it as a picture of Churchill. Roughly, intention plus 
resemblance equals a picture. Of course for the Wittgenstein of the TLP, this is also 
the case: mere isomorphism is not enough for meaningfulness. (After-all, iflanguage 
and the world are logically isomorphic, why should the representation not work the 
other way round? Why should it not be said that it is the world that pictures, or is a 
picture of, language?) But according to the TLP, the meaningfulness oflanguage does 
not derive from someone's intending it to stand for such-and-such. Rather, 
meaningfulness is inherent in language itself Syntax has a life of its own. Linguistic 
symbols mean this or that by themselves. Of course it is we who use language to mean 
or say this or that; so it is not quite accurate to say that language means this or that by 
itself The point, rather, is that language, in the TLP, is pre-made- it has meaning 
independently of us. Being ready-made, all we have to do is use it. (As we will see, the 
view of language presented in the PI is quite different - namely, that it is our use of 
symbols which invests them with meaning). This is the sense in which language is a 
24 Putnam, H. 1981. 
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point of view. A point of view is, one could say, a particular way of 'cutting the world 
up'. A point of view is, as it were, a 'conceptual scheme'. (The notion of 'conceptual 
scheme' is risky here. Ordinarily, when we talk of a conceptual scheme, we mean one 
way of looking at the world, from amongst various ways, where the various ways are 
incompatible or incommensurable with each other. However, when I use the term 
'conceptual scheme' I do so only to bring out the 'point-of-viewness' oflanguage as 
conceived in the TLP. I don't have the other connotations associated with the notion in 
mind). 
The discussion so far seems to raise a problem. Two somewhat separate issues seem to 
be blurred. The one is the idea that language is at once a point of view; and the second 
is the question of what sustains meaning. The problem comes about in the following 
way. It has been noted that, for the TLP, the 'perspectival' nature oflanguage is 
inherent in language itself Now, the TLP pins this 'perspective' nature down to 
objects and their inherent combinatory possibilities, in short, to logical form. (Logical 
form fixes what counts as language.) Thus the meaningfulness of language is ascribed 
to logical form- that is, logical form sustains meaning. However, putting the matter 
this way seems to rob logic of its autonomy. It seems to undermine the idea that the 
meaningfulness of language is inherent in language itself If language is at once a point 
of view, then language is autonomous - that is, language itself contains its own 
representational power. But if this is so, what role does the logical form of the world 
play? More specifically, how is it possible to ascribe the meaningfulness of language to 
logical form while at the same time preserving the idea that language is inherently 
representational? The two issues thus are: (i) language is intrinsically meaningful, and 
(ii) logical form sustains meaning. We know from earlier discussions that it is a futile 
and misguided effort to try and ground syntax - to try and reduce it to something more 
basic, to seek foundations. Still, however, there is some way in which the TLP offers 
as a grounding for syntax and that is the logical form of the world - the totality of 
possible combinations of objects. The situation stands like this: what fixes what counts 
as syntax (rules of sign-combinations) are the possible combinations of objects. And 
the possible combinations of objects derive from the nature of these objects. The 
combinatory possibilities are 'written into' the objects themselves. Logical form thus 
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sustains meaning. But one cannot really say that logical form grounds meaning - that 
is, that it is in virtue of logical form that syntax is what it is, although it would seem 
that one should be able to say this for the following reason. If, for example, I were to 
account for syntax in terms of some more basic logic (as had been attempted with 
mathematics, where Frege and Russell sought to reduce and hence 'ground' 
mathematics in some more basic calculus), then (ignoring its feasibility) I should be 
able to say that this system (this more basic calculus) grounds syntax. It is the 
foundation of syntax. It is in virtue of such-and-such that syntax is what it is. Surely 
the same can be said here. If logical form fixes syntax, then logical form is the 
foundation of syntax. But this would go against the spirit ofthe TLP. Syntax, 
according to the TLP, cannot be reduced. Logic is autonomous. How then are we to 
conceive of the role logical form plays, without jeopardizing the autonomy of syntax? I 
suggest the following: syntax and the world are (to be thought of) as one. It must be 
noted that although, in the introductory passages of the TLP, Wittgenstein talks about 
the world as actual states-of-affairs - that is, states-of-affairs which obtain - his use of 
the term 'the world' is not consistent throughout. This is particularly evident in the 
passages on Solipsism: 
The limits of language are the limits of the world. (TLP 5.61). 
As well as: 
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?( TLP 5.633). 
This kind oftalk gives the impression that 'the world' is to be understood here as 'the 
intellectual world,' the world of possibilities. 'The world' is just 'what is conceivable,' 
'what is intelligible,' 'what is describable.' Now, when one talks about language, one 
is, in the TLP, talking about thought, about intelligibility. And talk about 'the world' 
amounts to talk about the intelligible. Put differently, language is a point of view. But 
'the world' also amounts to 'a point of view', since 'the world' is the world of logical 
possibilities. Hence the claim: logic and the world are one. So we can save the idea 
that the logical form of the world is the foundation of syntax if we recognise that the 
logical form of the world is just the logical form of thought. Both refer to the totality 
of possibilities. The world and syntax are one and the same. 
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I've given reasons for thinking oflanguage as a point of view. Why should we think of 
the self (MS) as a point of view? Points C, D, E and F suggest this. Just like the eye is 
not in the visual field, but that which provides or generates the visual field - that which 
makes a visual field possible in the first place - so too with the subject. It is not in the 
world (D), rather it is what makes the world possible (what makes the point of view 
possible). Note here that if the subject is what makes a view possible, and that view is 
the world, on the one hand, and if the subject just is the point of view, on the other, 
then (G) follows: in some senses the subject and the world are one and the same. It is 
important to note that the subject (MS) is not something which means. The self, rather, 
is the 'meaning-self. The subject is the meaning-subject. The subject is the 'cutting-
up-the-world' subject, the 'intentional-subject.' The subject is, in this sense, a point of 
view. When I emphasize that the MS is not something that means, I do so to avoid 
thinking of the MS as something which has the capacity to mean, where this capacity is 
something separate to what makes it what it is. I admit that this is a rather obscure way 
of putting the matter. What I have in mind is something like this: in the philosophy of 
mind, one of the questions posed is what 'mind' is, and one of the issues is whether 
'mind' is something which has various mental states (in other words there is the mind 
and it has various mental states) in contrast to the idea that the mind is just the 
(collection) of mental states. My point here is that when I say that the MS is a meaning 
subject, I mean it analogously to the latter idea, that the mind is just (a collection of) 
mental states. It is not something which has an identity of its own, and in addition to 
that has mental states. Schlossberger puts the matter as follows : Wittgenstein, he says, 
looks for the subject in language. Schlossberger then goes on to distinguish between 
the notions of' empirical self and 'metaphysical self. The 'empirical self, he suggests, 
is a set of sentences - a set of signs which signify. The MS is in the empirical self 
because the MS is the intentionality of language itself I understand him to be saying 
that the empirical self is the self which remembers, which praises, which feels happy, 
angry, etc. The MS, by contrast, is a perspective. To wit: ifl say 'I feel angry' then I'm 
talking about the empirical self But what makes anger and happiness possible - that is, 
what makes it possible that we recognise (such things as) anger and happiness (that we 
cut up the world like this) is a function of the MS. The MS is, to use the expression 
again, a point of view. Schlossberger says that the MS is the intentionality of language 
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itself Now to talk about the intentionality of language is to talk about its 
meaningfulness. To say that language is meaningful is to say that it 'cuts up the world' 
- is a point of view. So when Schlossberger says that the MS is the intentionality of 
language itself, it amounts to claiming - as I too want to claim - that the MS is a point 
of view. And this amounts further to the claim I made earlier that the MS is identical to 
language. The subject, says Schlossberger, resides in language itself That the subject 
and language are identical is borne out by some passages from Notebooks25 entered a 
few days apart: 
A stone, the body of a beast, my body, all stand on the same level. 
And: 
Is this the solution of the puzzle why men have always believed that there was one spirit 
common to the whole world? 
'Language' does not refer to specific languages (English, Sanskrit, sign-language) but 
rather, as I have emphasized, to a 'conceptual scheme' or view which runs through all 
languages. Wittgenstein talks of a 'spirit common to the whole world.' Maybe this 
bears on his thoughts about the MS as a point of view common to all people. 
If this is right, it amounts to saying that there is only one metaphysical subject - and 
this subject is identical to (the meaningfulness of) language itself 
Recall that the question we are concerned with is that of why syntax (the limits) cannot 
be represented. And my intention was to address this issue by looking at why, for 
Wittgenstein, the MS is regarded as ineffable. So far we have discussed the idea that 
the MS and language are identical. We have yet to examine why the MS is regarded as 
ineffable. Wittgenstein's account of the MS turns on the analogy between the relation 
between the MS and the world, on the one hand, and the relation between the eye and 
the visual field, on the other. One cannot, Wittgenstein argues, find the 'I' (the MS) by 
introspection, in the same way that one cannot find the physical eye anywhere in the 
visual field. Introspection only provides one with the contents of experience. Any 
25 Notebooks, October, 12, 1916, quoted in Schlossberger, E., p142, 1978. 
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attempt to find the subject in experience will fail - any putative account of the MS is 
false - precisely because the MS is the pre-condition of experience, and we saw earlier 
that pre-conditions cannot be the object of any examination. In the same way no 
examination of the visual field will yield the 'seeing' eye, precisely because the eye 
generates the visual field. What the visual field provides us with is the contents of the 
visual experience. However, the position from which the contents are seen is not itself 
in the visual field. The general point that is being made is that the pre-conditions of 
thought (or experience) are not themselves part of the content of that experience. In 
other words, the limits cannot in any way be experienced (cannot be the object of 
experience). We are 'caged' or 'walled-in', so to speak, by our limits. But these walls 
are of a special character?6 they are not like the walls of this room. The walls of this 
room prevent you from seeing what lies outside them, but if I opened a window I 
would be able to see outside - I would be able to transcend these limits. Rather, the 
walls comprising the limits of my thought are like the outer limits of the visual field. 
Although it makes sense to talk about what lies outside the walls of my room, it makes 
no sense to talk about something which lies outside what I could possibly see. There is 
no such thing as 'unseen visual space' in the way there is unseen physical space. 
Syntax plays the same role as the outer limits of the visual field. Thus it makes no 
sense to talk about what lies outside syntax (or experience) because syntax is the limit 
of what makes sense. There can be nothing that lies outside what counts as 
conceivable, since what counts as conceivable is just what we can, in principle, 
conceive. The 'walls' of syntax, which limit what is conceivable, are therefore false 
walls. They are a false cage, or as Pears would have it, a false prison27, since they do 
not really divide an inside from an outside. For these reasons it is incoherent to attempt 
to talk about the limits of my visual field. To do so requires a view from outside my 
visual field. However, nothing could ever count as seeing from outside my visual field, 
since whatever I could come to see will itself be part of that field. In the same way it is 
incoherent to talk about the limits of thought (logic). Any such attempt requires a point 
of view from outside logic. However, again, nothing could ever count as thinking from 
outside logic. Just as there can be no such thing as the visual field being seen from 
26 Stern, D.F., 1995, makes this enlightening contrast. 
27 Pears, D. 1988. 
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outside, and just as we say the MS cannot be objectified (cannot be found as an object 
in experience), so too with syntax. It cannot be objectified or represented. 
In sum, there is, as Thomas Nagef8 puts it, no view from nowhere. There is no 
perspectiveless view, no view from outside logic. Thus any attempt to make sense of 
our condition, any attempt to say that our condition is such and such, or even to 
criticize it (to say that something is wrong somewhere) is doomed to fail. There is, in a 
manner of speaking, no place to stand to examine that which we are in the grip of For 
this reason any version of realism, anti-realism, idealism, etc., is incoherent. Such 
accounts attempt to talk about the relation between language and the world. They are 
attempts to talk about our condition - to get out of language, to transcend the limits of 
thought. But they do not transcend it; all they do, according to Wittgenstein, is to run 
up against the limits of language. 
We can get a better grip on this idea by considering what Nagel says about the notion 
of objectivity in The View from Nowhere?9 According to Nagel ultimate objectivity - a 
view of ourselves as observers - cannot be achieved. He presents several reasons for 
this claim, of which I discuss two below. My purpose in examining these arguments is 
to get a better focus on the point Wittgenstein is making when he claims that we (as 
subjects or as observers) cannot represent that which makes representation possible. 
According to Nagel: 
A view ..... is more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the individual's 
make-up and position in the world .... We may think of reality as a set of concentric spheres, 
progressively revealed as we detach gradually from the contingencies of the self... Thus 
objectivity allows us to transcend our particular viewpoint and develop an expanded 
consciousness that takes in the world more fully ..... But if what we want is to understand the 
whole world, we can't forget about those subjective starting points indefinitely; we and our 
personal perspectives belong to the world. One limit encountered by the pursuit of objectivity 
appears when it turns its back on the self and tries to encompass subjectivity in its 
conception of the real. The recalcitrance of this material to objective understanding requires 
28 Nagel, T., 1986. 
29 Nagel, T., 1986 
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both a modification of the form of objectivity and a recognition that it cannot by itself provide 
a complete picture of the world, .... 30 
The thrust of Nagel's point is that although we can opt for greater objectivity, this 
project is limited by the fact that certain phenomena are, in essence, subjective. An 
objective perspective of such phenomena will thus leave something out. To wit: when 
we transcend a particular viewpoint with a more objective one - one that is supposed 
to encompass the less objective one - we fail to capture the 'point-of-viewness' of the 
previous one. But this 'point-of-viewness' is also part of reality (of what there is). Any 
objective perspective of a subjective phenomenon thus does not tell the whole story. 
Subjectivity is recalcitrant to objective understanding. 
It is important to note that this is not the point Wittgenstein is making. Wittgenstein' s 
point is that you can't give an 'outside' perspective of your point-of-view since 
'outside' your point of view you have, in a manner of speaking, no recourse to that 
which makes a point of view possible. Your point of view is what you're in the grip of 
(what makes thought possible), and you can't give an (explanatory) account of what 
you're in the grip of since this requires you to operate outside what makes thought 
possible. Since nothing outside these limits counts as thought, no such objective 
perspective is possible. Nagel's point, on the other hand, is that an objective view of 
the subjective cannot be had, since the objective and subjective view are two different 
kinds of view, the latter being recalcitrant to the former. For Wittgenstein, a putative 
objective view of the subjective will not work, not on account of recalcitrance, but 
because such a view does not amount to a view at all, since the subjective view is the 
very condition of having a point of view. There can be no view from nowhere since 
any view is subject to the limits of thought, and insofar as it is subject to these limits, it 
cannot be transcended. The point is that, for Nagel, we can't objectify the subjective 
because of recalcitrance, whereas, for Wittgenstein, we can't objectify the subjective 
because we're in the grip of such subjectivity.31 
30 Nagel, T.,l986, pp5-6. 
31 It must be noted that it is only worthwhile drawing such a contrast between Wittgenstein and Nagel 
if the following is taken to be the case: when Nagel talks about subjectivity he is not merely referring 
to qualia (the 'what it is like' quality of subjective states). His use of subjectivity involves the notion of 
point -of-view or perspective. He thinks that one perspective can encompass another in a limited way -
namely, leaving out the 'point-of-viewness'. This is something Wittgenstein may have agreed with, as 
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Nagel's second reason for denying the possibility of ultimate objectivity can be found 
in the following passage: 
.... objective self-surveillance will inevitably be incomplete, since some knower must remain 
behind the lens if anything is to be known ........ The incomplete view of ourselves in the world 
includes a large blind spot, behind our eyes, so to speak, that hides something we cannot 
take into account in acting, because it is what acts.32 
The point here is that we cannot ultimately give an objective perspective since every 
account takes place from some perspective. And since it is our perspective as observers 
that we want to capture in such an ultimate account, the account is impossible. This is 
because every time we attempt to step outside ourselves - to 'see' ourselves as 
observers - we as observers do the observing and so remain unobserved. The reason 
we can't step outside ourselves is thus a logical one. The Wittgensteinian position 
does not rule out looking at the matter in this way. However, Wittgenstein's emphasis 
is different. For Wittgenstein the point is that that which makes observation possible 
cannot be observed, since it is the condition of observing. Nagel's argument is an 
infinite regress argument. Wittgenstein' s is an argument from incoherence. It is 
important to understand that what is being denied by the Wittgensteinian position is 
not that we cannot make sense of our condition because we are intellectually deficient. 
The point is not that we do not have the intellectual apparatus to examine our 
condition. 
Wittgenstein's position can also be contrasted with that of Colin McGinn. In his book 
Problems in Philosophy McGinn argues for a position he calls 'Transcendental 
Naturalism'. 33 He argues that our representational powers are not adequate to explain 
our representational powers. This is our intellectual predicament. In order to give an 
account of our representational powers, we would require, he maintains, radically new 
concepts in order to provide such an explanatory framework. But, he argues, such a 
long as the perspective which one is trying to transcend is not a condition of having a point of view in 
the first place. It must not be the mode of our representation. 
32 Nagel, T.,l986, p127. 
33 McGinn, C., 1993. 
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conceptual innovation lies beyond our intellectual ability. It lies in a sphere of 
intellectual space we cannot reach. Our intellectual capacities are too impoverished, he 
says, to understand their own nature. It is important to see that this, too, is not the 
point Wittgenstein is making. Wittgenstein' s conviction is that the very entertaining of 
the idea of making sense of logic is incoherent. There is no such thing as a 'sphere of 
intellectual space which we cannot reach'. Rather, 'intellectual space' is determined by 
what we can understand: what we can understand just is the understandable. There can 
be no talk of the understandable beyond what we can understand. Thus if we cannot 
reach 'it', it doesn't count as anything at all. What there is is what makes sense; if it 
doesn't make sense it isn't anything at all. What lies on the 'other side' of our 
understanding, is, as the TLP says, simply nonsense. Our intellectual powers are not, as 
McGinn holds, too impoverished to understand their own nature. The point is that 
making sense of our intellectual powers involves the incoherent idea of 'getting 
outside' our intellect. McGinn believes that if we had 'radically new concepts' we 
would be able to have such an 'outside understanding'. But again, the point is that we 
can't talk of concepts outside our understanding, since outside understanding is just 
nonsense. For these reasons the TLP claims that its aim is to set a limit to thought 
'from within' (since it is only 'within' that any intellectual moves can take place) by 
saying only what can be said - that is, by only saying that which is subject to our 
condition, namely, descriptions of contingent states-of-affairs, and passing over in 
silence what cannot be said. 
But although our condition cannot be stated, it can, as we have seen, be shown. 
Logical and factual propositions are, for Wittgenstein, examples of haw language 
shows what it cannot say: that logical propositions are vacuous shows the limits of 
language; factual propositions embody the rules of syntax and in this way display what 
can be said. As for the metaphysical subject, the same applies. We cannot talk about it. 
Rather, 'grasping' the subject occurs in our grasping factual states-of-affairs Gust as 
we cannot represent our visual field, but that there is a visual field shows itself in our 
seeing of states-of-affairs). Our epistemic access to the limits is thus not one of 
representation, but is a kind of insight. We do not grasp the rules 'just by themselves'. 
We can't merely isolate or represent just the rules. Rather, we shaw what the rules are 
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in our representation of the facts. The facts embody the rules. Furthermore, because 
the rules enable us to grasp the facts, every representation at once shows the rules. All 
representation is dependent on the rules, and the rules are dependent on representation 
(propositions), in order for them to be exhibited. If the shape of an object can be 
compared to syntax, and if the object itself is to count as the proposition, then one 
could say that the shape of the object can only be made manifest by the representation 
of the object- you cannot represent the shape without at the same time representing an 
object. The shape is dependent on the object for it to be displayed. On the other hand, 
by means of the representation of any object, the shape is at once displayed. Form, as 
Wittgenstein says, is the possibility of structure; (logical) form makes structure (a 
pitch, a colour) possible. A structure cannot lack logical form. If its a structure at all it 
must have some logical form. But then again, structure makes it possible to 'see' form 
- form cannot be 'seen' or 'shown' except in structure. 
As concluding remarks to this section, I want to stress a point that has been made 
before. Wittgenstein's concern to articulate a distinction between what can and what 
cannot be said is not fueled with Positivist interests. That is, it was not his goal, like it 
was that of the Logical Positivists, to banish metaphysics from the realm of meaningful 
propositions, and in so doing discredit their status. Rather, his intention was to ascribe 
to metaphysics its 'proper place'. Metaphysics does not belong to the realm of 
descriptive discourse; however, just because this is so, contra the Positivists, 
metaphysics has a higher status than that of representational discourse. To wit: there is 
an underlying contention in Wittgenstein's work, which we can call the 'insignificance 
of the sayable'. Earlier on I quoted Wittgenstein saying in a letter to von Ficker: 
My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is 
precisely this second part that is the important one. 34 
And again in TLP 6.52: 
34 Paul Engelmann, Letter from L.Wittgenstein., ppl43-144. The letter was written in 1919, quoted in 
Stem, D. 1995, p8. 
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We find that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems 
of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself 
is the answer. 
I take Wittgenstein to mean that if there are no (scientific) questions left, but the 
problems of life remain untouched, then these' problems' and perhaps their 'solutions' 
are not a factual business. The 'understanding' or grasping of them is not like grasping 
contingent states-of-affairs. They are grasped in some other way. They are 
inexpressible. 
There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is what is mystical. (T6.522) 
So it seems clear, then, that Wittgenstein's intention, far from being to discredit 
metaphysics, was to save it from the banal status of representational discourse. The 
following remarks on the propositions of ethics and religion confirm this sentiment: 
My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk 
Ethics or Religion was to run up against the boundaries of language. This running against the 
walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire 
to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute 
valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it 
is a document of the tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting 
deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. 35 
It seems that just as the making of ethical propositions are tendencies worth 
respecting, so too with metaphysical propositions. Why? Ethical (and religious) 
propositions are, according to Wittgenstein, attempts to talk about 'the Absolute' in 
the domain of Ethics. This amounts pretty much to what goes on in an attempt to talk 
about the limits of thought. To wit: when we attempt to talk about the limits of 
thought (which we take to be the essential features of reality) we are in effect assuming 
an outside position - a position from outside what we are in the grip of - which is, as 
we've seen, an incoherent project. It is 'absolutely hopeless'. In the same way, an 
attempt to talk about, say, the 'Absolute Good', is an attempt to make sense of the 
35 A Lecture on Ethics, ppll-12, published in Philosophical Review 74, No.1, 1965, pp3-16, quoted 
in Fann, K.T. 1969, p28. 
84 
'ethical' walls of our cage. However, just because we're in the grip of these ethical 
grids we can't make sense of them. It is an attempt to get outside our ethical limits, 
which is, as Wittgenstein says, an utterly hopeless one. But, says Wittgenstein, this 
attempt is something he would never ridicule. The following paragraph again reflects 
this sentiment: 
Man has the urge to thrust against the limits of language. Think for instance about one's 
astonishment that anything exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a 
question and there is no answer to it. Anything we can say must, a priori, be only nonsense. 
Nevertheless, we thrust against the limits of language. But the tendency, the thrust, points to 
something ... I can only say: I don't belittle this human tendency; I take my hat off to it. .. For 
me the facts are unimportant. But what men mean when they say that "The world exists" lies 
close to my heart. 36 
But, one may wonder why, if metaphysical articulations are produced by a combination 
of (i) the tendency to talk about the essential features of reality and (ii) a 
misunderstanding of the logic of our language, they should be attributed such a special 
status? If metaphysical propositions are attempts to cross the limits, if they are 
attempts to do something wrong, why should such attempts not just be set straight and 
left at that? Why does Wittgenstein express such respect for the impulse to do 
metaphysics? Perhaps it is because metaphysical propositions are attempts to express 
insights or a sense of wonder, which, strictly speaking, does not yield to language 
(intellectual discourse). We tend to grasp outwards in a way which is, strictly speaking, 
not in language, but we want to express it in language. However, our language is 
inadequate. It is only suited to expressing the facts. And so when we use language to 
express the 'insights' we experience, what we say ends up as nonsense. 
Anthony Holiday has suggested37 another way of looking at the significance of 
metaphysical propositions in Wittgenstein' s work. Philosophical propositions, as 
attempts to cross the bounds of intelligibility, are significant, he claims, precisely 
because they tell us something about ourselves, namely, that human beings have an 
36 A Lecture on Ethics, ppll-16, published in Philosophical Review 74, No.I, 1965, pp3-16, quoted 
in Fann, K.T. 1969, p28. 
37 In conversation. 
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utterly hopeless tendency to want to see from 'outside' - in effect, to see or describe 
everything. The effect of such a realization ought to be a humbling one. It lets us see 
ourselves for who we are. By running up against the limits (transgressing the bounds of 
sense and not conforming to the rules of syntax) we gain a kind of self-knowledge 
which ought to produce humility. It reminds us of our imperfections. The point is like 
the one that can be made about Socrates' dialectics. The Socratic questions have, or 
are intended to have, the effect of reducing our intelligence to aporia. This way we can 
get a sense of who we properly are. This Socractic indulgence in dialectics is meant to 
teach us something about ourselves, and what we learn ought to have a reducing or 
shrinking effect. Just like Jesus' saying to those who wanted to stone the adulteress, 
'He who hath committed no sin, let him cast the first stone,' had a humbling effect 
(because now, by putting the matter this way, they could all see that they were not 
faultless), so too, with this point: seeing that we have a tendency to transgress the 
bounds of sense ought to produce a sense of humility within us. 
It has been suggested that Wittgenstein' s preoccupation with logic and the limits of 
thought is parallel to his moral preoccupation with sin. In both cases the dividing line 
between right and wrong must be recognised and not crossed. His preoccupation with 
only saying what can be said - that is, staying on the one side of the line while fighting 
off the tendency to cross the limits - is like his preoccupation with wanting to do the 
right thing while fighting off the tendency to sin. Remaining within the bounds of sense 
- of legitimate discourse - is like remaining within the limits of legitimate moral 
action.38 A testimony to this conviction is reflected by a report of Russell's in Ray 
Monk' s39 biography of Wittgenstein. The story goes that Wittgenstein had often come 
to Russell's rooms in the evening to talk philosophy. He would spend hours tensely 
pacing up and down the room in complete silence till deep into the night. Russell never 
ventured to send him home for fear that if he did so Wittgenstein would commit 
suicide. On one such evening, while Wittgenstein was going through his pacing ritual, 
38 Shields, PR., in his book Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, discusses this 
issue at length. 
39 Monk, Ray. ,1991. 
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Russell ventured a question: 'Are you thinking about logic or your sins?', to which 
Wittgenstein fiercely replied: 'Both!'. 
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LOOKING AHEAD TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
In this section I present a brief account of some of the main ways in which 
Wittgenstein' s Tractarian account of language underwent revision during the period in 
which he wrote the Philosophical Investigations. 
Wittgenstein' s concerns in the PI is, as it was in the TLP, to draw the limits of 
intelligible discourse. This amounted, as we have seen, to articulating the essence of a 
proposition. The question to be answered thus is: what turns a string of marks into a 
meaningful expression? As indicated earlier on, both the task involved in, and the 
purpose for this project have strong similarities to Kant's project in his Critique of 
Pure Reason. Wittgenstein believed, like Kant, that philosophers have a tendency to 
cross the boundary of meaningful discourse, and in so doing produce metaphysical 
propositions - expressions which appear to be genuine propositions, but are in fact not 
so. They resemble genuine propositions only in terms of surface grammar - that is, in 
terms of their outward appearance. He, like Kant, therefore wanted to delineate the 
exact boundary between meaningful and nonsensical discourse, so as to be able to 
caution anyone when they wanted to cross this boundary and so, in effect, caution 
them against doing metaphysics. 
Wittgenstein's later work is characterized by two doctrinal changes1: 
1) Abandonment of Essentialism 
Wittgenstein eventually came to realise that his account of language was too narrow. It 
excluded much of what we ordinarily take to be intelligible discourse. In the TLP only 
assertoric (fact-stating, contingent) propositions qualify as bonafide linguistic 
discourse. This has to do with Wittgenstein's doctrinal preconceptions about language. 
To wit: he believed that, under all the seemingly diverse forms oflanguage, all 
language admits of a uniform logical structure. This structure, although not 
immediately discernible from the surface structure of language, can be uncovered by 
philosophical analysis. Thus he regarded differences in propositional structure as 
merely superficial. What united them all was their common logical structure. His views 
1 I follow Pears, DF. (1971) in classifying these changes as 'doctrinal'. 
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in his later works, however, stand diametrically opposed to this earlier view: rather 
than regarding the diverse forms of language as superficial differences, he now came to 
take them as revealing the 'essence' oflanguage. But this notion of essence was very 
different to the one he had in mind earlier. Language, he now believed, does not have a 
single uniform essence as in the TLP; it does not have a uniform structure. However, 
its diverse forms have features which serve to unite it - so in a sense it has a 
characteristic or common, albeit not uniform, feature, which allows us to classify or 
group all such forms as part oflanguage. Because the Wittgenstein of PI believed that 
language is open-ended (what counts as language is not a .fixed set of expressions), it is 
a bit misleading to put the matter this way. What should be said, rather, is that the 
characteristic feature of language in the PI serves, not to allow us to group together 
everything that counts as language, but rather to allow us to disqualify as meaningful 
those expressions which do not admit of certain features. The unifying feature in this 
case is not a uniform feature, but is cashed out in terms of the notion of family 
resemblance: the propositions oflanguage do not have a uniform structure, but are 
part of language because they have certain features in virtue of which they resemble 
each other, and in virtue of which they can all be said to belong to the same family or 
families. Propositions admit of resemblances in the same way as the faces of people 
belonging to the same family resemble each other. Wittgenstein also cashed out the 
unifying feature of propositions in terms of language games. Propositions are related 
to each other in pretty much the same way as games are related to each other. What 
makes an activity count as a game is not a uniform structure (which it shares with 
other games) but rather similarities such as being goal-oriented etc. 
2) Abandonment ofFoundationalism 
Wittgenstein came to realize that his account of language was wrong not only because 
it was too exclusive (a result of his essentialism) but for another reason, one that 
makes the TLP account wrong quite independently of its essentialism. He had first 
thought that the structure of the world determined the structure of language and thus 
that the structure of the world conferred meaningfulness on language. (The structure 
of the world is the foundation of language. It is what sustains the meaningfulness of 
language.) Thus one can say 'the cat is on the mat' since this is a possibility in the 
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world, but one cannot say 'the chair is between its own legs' since this is not a 
posibility in the world. In his later work he abandoned this idea. The relation, he now 
thought, is the other way round. Whereas in the TLP there was an independently 
existing world of logical possibilities, in the PI it is language which fixes what is to 
count as world. In the TLP the combinatory possibilities of a word are determined by 
the combinatory possibilities of the object for which it stands. In the PI, however, what 
counts as such-and-such an object is fixed by the grammar of the word which happens 
to stand for the object. Thus one cannot say, or rather, it is not a possibility that 'the 
chair is between its own legs'since the grammar of the words 'chair', 'between', and 
'own' do not permit such a combination. The point here is that (i) syntax is not fixed by 
the (logical form of the) world, but rather, (ii) something else- we will come to see 
what - determines the rules of our language and (iii) the notion of 'world' is not 
independent of language. 
So the structure of language cannot be accounted for by something which lies outside 
language and is independent of language. There are, as Pears2 puts it, no independent 
points of reference or support outside language. Ultimately, and this is the realization 
expressed in the PI, any support for linguistic features derives from language-users 
themselves. It derives from their established linguistic practices. This issue comes out 
at its strongest in Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following in the PI. Both in the 
TLP and the PI Wittgenstein maintained that speaking a language is a normative 
activity - that is, speaking a language is a matter of following linguistic rules. 3 In the PI 
he makes the point that a sign does not by itself fix its meaning. Its meaningfulness 
requires a context or setting, which is provided by established linguistic practices or 
conventions. In other words, the meaning of a sign is fixed by linguistic conventions. 
This is in contrast to the TLP account of language. The TLP maintained that signs, just 
in bearing a particular form- namely, the logical form of the world- are meaningful. 
The realization expressed in the PI is that this is insufficient. A sign, he says, is open to 
a number of interpretations (proliferation of meanings). This being the case, how can a 
2 Pears DF, 1971, p13. 
3 Wittgenstein did not speak of rules as such in the TLP, but he was aware of the normative issue. For 
example, in TLP 2.173 he says ' .... a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly.', and in TLP 6.126 
he talks about 'rules that deal with signs'. 
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sign mean one thing rather than another, and how, more generally, is language 
possible? But language is possible. What halts proliferation of meanings is established 
linguistic practices or customs. The insight is that a sign must be applied (in some or 
other customary way) before it can be meaningful. 4 Here we see a distinct shift in 
Wittgenstein's account of the limits: it is no longer the logical form of the world which 
fixes meaning, which invests a string of marks with meaningfulness. No longer is it 
logical form which guarantees intelligibility. Rather, meaningfulness is fixed by our 
various established linguistic practices. Wittgenstein thinks of our different linguistic 
practices as various language games, each game governed by its own rules. So, just as 
we have games like chess, draughts, etc., which can be distinguished by the different 
rules which govern moves in such games, so too with language. Our linguistic 
practices can be categorised into different games; for example, we have the game of 
justification, the game of reasoning inductively, the game of raising children, the game 
ofteaching, the game of naming objects, the game of telling jokes, and so on. Each of 
these games can be distinguished by means of the different rules which govern what 
count as legitimate moves in the game. These games, collectively, form part of what 
Wittgenstein calls our form of life. More completely, our form of life consists not only 
of the different 'games' we partake in but of the spectrum of our natural history- of 
the fact that humans walk on two legs, that humans reproduce sexually, that humans 
feel pain, that humans have various sensory perceptions (visual, acoustic, tactile, 
olfactory and taste). These various (non-linguistic) aspects of our natural history have 
a bearing on the linguistic aspects. The game of ascribing sensations like pain, for 
instance, is only possible because we are 'wired-up' in a certain way. Thus one can say 
that it is our form of life which invests our words with meaning. If a word or 
expression has a use in our form of life then it counts as meaningful. 
Wittgenstein's comparison of words in a language with tools in a tool-box aptly brings 
out the shift in perspective between the TLP and the PI. In Blue Books5, he says: 
4 This insight comes as early as Philosophical Grammar. He says: 'if the method of projection is a bridge, 
then it is one that is not built, as long as the application is not made.' By 'method of projection' he means the way 
in which language is linked to the world. And the point made here is that language is linked to the 
world by means of application. In other words, signs are meaningful if they are applied (in a 
customary way). (Philosophical Grammar, p213, quoted in Malcolm, N., 1986, plOO.) 
5 Blue Books, p 67, quoted in Fann, 1969, p69. 
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Think of words as instruments characterized by their use. 
And in PI 11 he says: 
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue 
pot, glue, nails, screws. - The function of words are as diverse as the functions of these 
objects. 
The idea is that a word's meaning is linked to its use, and given that words, just like 
tools, have a diverse number of uses (different tools are used to do different things), it 
is no good setting out to look for a uniform feature of words as the TLP attempted to 
do. There is thus not one function that all words have in common, as maintained in the 
TLP, where the sole function of words was to name things. However, it is not only 
words, but sentences as well, which, according to the PI, must be looked at as tools. 
He says: 
Look at the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment. (fi 421) 
And what Wittgenstein says about words and sentences applies as well to what he 
thinks about language. Just like all instruments are usually used for some purpose, but 
cannot be said to be used for a single purpose, so too with language. Language has a 
goal, but the goal is not a uniform one: there is no single purpose that language is used 
for (contra the TLP where the function of language was purely descriptive). In the PI 
Wittgenstein lists a few of the purposes of language, hereby showing its multiplicity 
and heterogeny: 
Giving orders, - and obeying them-
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-
Constructing an object from description ( a drawing)-
Reporting an event-
Speculating about an event-
Forming and testing an hypotheses-





Making a joke; telling it-
Solving a problem in practical mathematics-
Translating from one language into another-
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. (PI 23) 
Directly after presenting this list Wittgenstein says : 
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are 
used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the 
structure of language. (Including the author of the TLP Logico-Phi/osophicus ). (EI 23) 
Wittgenstein' s conviction in the TLP was that language admits of a single uniform 
structure (it is truth-functionally structured) and a single function (the depiction of 
possible states-of-affairs). In the above quotation he clearly rejects this. Language is 
not a single tool with one function and one structure, but rather, language is a 
collection of tools with heterogeneous structures and heterogeneous functions. Thus 
Wittgenstein' s new conception of language is a pragmatic or instrumentalist one. 
Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. (PI 569) 
Thus in the TLP the mark of meaningfulness is that an expression possesses logical 
form and the source of meaningfulness is the logical form of the world. In the PI the 
mark of meaningfulness is that a proposition has a use in some language-game, and the 
sources of meaningfulness are our socio-linguistic practices. Our socio-linguistic 
practices are the ultimate recourse of any explanation: they themselves cannot have an 
explanation. Whereas in the TLP our linguistic acts were accounted for by their 
reference to an objective reality, a reality which gave stability to what counts as 
meaningful, in the PI there is no objective support outside our linguistic practices. 
Nothing 'else' explains why we do such and such (nothing explains why such and such 
an act or expression is meaningful). To make the point in terms of linguistic rules: in 
the TLP it was the logical form of the world (an independent reality) that sustained 
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linguistic rules. In the PI the rules are sustained by the fact that we happen to engage in 
the various practices we do. The practices are an embodiment of the rules of language. 
The rules are not something which conform to something else; rather, the rules are just 
constituted by those practices. The point can be brought out by the following analogy: 
the rules do not form a ready laid out pathway (a prepared course or track), rather, 
they are like the mucous that the snail leaves behind: the snail may not be following a 
ready laid-out track, but its particular course of action leaves a track - the track lies 
behind, rather than having been set out ahead. The track is how it is because of the 
way the snail happened to have proceeded. This, in a way, is how it is with us. The 
ways human beings happen to go on (the practices they happen to engage in) set the 
standard for what is going to count as intelligible. Pears6 aptly calls this 'Wittgenstein's 
anthropocentrism'. 
A further feature of the shift in Wittgenstein's way of thinking is that of the nature or 
method of his investigation. In the TLP his attempt to isolate the essence of language 
proceeded according to what one can call a 'scientific' method, by asking what must 
be possible, or how things must be, in order to explain a particular phenomenon 
(language). This is akin to the hypothetico-deductive method in science. Scientists 
observe certain phenomena, and then they seek an account which explains those 
phenomena. Their explanation is thus an hypothesis to the best explanation. Of course 
Wittgenstein believed that his account of language in the TLP was not merely the best 
explanation; rather, it was the explanation- demanded a priori by the very 
phenomenon of fact-stating discourse, and which explains the phenomenon of 
language. Furthermore, whereas the scientist's project is an empirical one, that of 
seeking an empirical explanation for his observations, Wittgenstein' s project was, 
strictly speaking, a logical one, that sought an a priori (transcendental) explanation. 
Nevertheless, the important point is that both methods seek to provide explanations 
which best explain a given phenomenon. Language and the world must have such-and-
such features (elementary sentences, elementary states-of-affairs, objects) given that 
language is possible. And it is in virtue of this feature that the TLP's account of 
language can be regarded as proceeding in a scientific manner. In his later study, 
6 Pears, DF., 1971, pl70. 
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however, once he located the intentional character of language in our form oflife, his 
study became a descriptive one. No longer was he engaged in talk of hypothesising and 
theorising; rather his method was now one of observing and describing. Language, as 
Pears 7 aptly puts it, is a feature of human life, and because it has no independent basis 
outside that of human life, it should be examined in the context of human life. 
What this involved was that rather than seeking an all-inclusive and general system (or 
theory), Wittgenstein now came to concentrate on and appreciate the particular case 
in its own right. The consequence of this was that linguistic philosophy, for 
Wittgenstein, could now never by systematic - that is, he could now no longer seek to 
give a general and all-inclusive account of language. The particular case, as it stands, is 
every bit as revealing as to the 'essential' (or characteristic) features of language. The 
variations within language are not superficial ones, which actually have a common 
uniform deep structure; rather, these variations are all part of the character of 
language. The logical structure of language does not lie underneath its surface 
structure, to be revealed only by analytic excavation. Rather, its logical structure lies 
right there on the surface. To understand the 'essence' oflanguage, all one has to do is 
look and describe - that is, observe and describe what role an expression or sign plays 
in human life. Thus the two accounts differ not only in what they attribute 
meaningfulness to, but also in methodology. The TLP attempted an a priori account of 
language; the PI presents a descriptive account. In the PI Wittgenstein realised that the 
question of the meaningfulness of language must be answered by looking at language 
in operation. His question, 'What must be the case for language to work?' is now 
treated as: 'In virtue of what, as a matter of fact, does language work?'. Or rather, 
'What in fact makes language work?' The important point to note here is that although 
both the TLP and the PI offer accounts of meaning (and are thus both concerned with 
the limits of language), Wittgenstein's realization that his TLP account of meaning was 
wrong did not lead him to seek another objective account. And this is so, because he 
realised that what was wrong with the earlier account was not just that it pinned 
meaningfulness down to the wrong criterion (objective reality), but that it was wrong 
to pin meaningfulness down to any objective reality. In other words, the insight is not 
7 Pears, DF., 1971. 
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that he had given a wrong account of the foundations of language, but that language 
has no foundations. He thus did not seek an alternative objective reality in order to 
account for language, but abandoned that kind of project altogether. Talk of our 'form 
of life', although it replaces appeal to the 'logical form of the world', is not a mere 
substitution of one criterion for another. The insight, rather, is that there is no 
explanation oflanguage but just descriptions of our linguistic practices. So, although 
our form of life is used to justify our linguistic practices, this isn't a real justification. 
Consider: if asked why I watch television, I might reply (might justify my activity by 
saying) that I do it for relaxation, or for entertainment. This answer explains my 
action. But now suppose I were asked why I seek entertainment and I reply that that is 
just one of the things we humans do. This is not a reason in the same way as the reason 
given in answer to the question of why I watch television. It is really just a description 
of one of the practices that we engage in. Pears puts it aptly: ' ......... there is only one 
possible theory here, the theory that there is nothing but the facts about the relevant 
linguistic practices. ' 8 
A further difference between the two works is that in the PI Wittgenstein' s task and 
method are in harmony. In the TLP this was not the case. There he had set himself the 
task of drawing the bounds of sense - from the inside - but his method contradicted 
this: the method consisted precisely of giving an account oflanguage from the outside 
- and in so doing crossing the boundary which the task was actually meant to locate 
and secure.9 In the PI the task and method are in harmony. The task is to describe and 
the method proceeds just like this: he refrains from making any sweeping 
generalisations or producing hypotheses or theories. No longer does he talk from the 
lofty heights of abstraction. Rather, his examination proceeds 'on the ground', as it 
were, with detailed descriptions oflanguage-in-use presented in dialectic form. A 
language-user makes a linguistic mistake, and Wittgenstein responds in dialectic 
fashion to this mistake by pointing out that he has made a mistake. The way he points 
it out is by reminding the language-user of the everyday or customary use of an 
8 Pears, D. F. 1971, pl71. 
9 He tried to remedy this internal contradiction, however, by claiming that his propositions in the TLP 
constitute important nonsense - a ladder to climb in order to see the world aright and afterwards 
discard. His propositions don't say anything, but they show the limits of language. 
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expression - in short, by reminding the user of the rules governing the use of a word -
and showing him that the way he is using the word is not in accordance with the 
customary way - that is, not in accordance with the rules. 
Another difference between the two works concerns the notion of rules. In my 
discussion of the TLP, logical form was referred to as syntax. Syntax constitutes the 
rules governing licit sentence construction. The syntax of our language not only 
included logical propositions (tautologies and contradictions) but all those expressions 
which, according to Wittgenstein, constitute the 'mould' or 'spectacles' through which 
we look at the world -for example, scientific laws such as 'every event has a cause', 
propositions such as 'seven is a number', 'red is colour'. These fix legitimate sentence 
construction. In the PI the notion of syntax is replaced by that of grammar. The 
grammar of a word or expression is its particular use in a language-game - and this 
particular use constitutes the rule for the future use of the word or expression. Thus 
grammar constitutes the rules governing licit sentence construction. However, whereas 
in the TLP the rules (syntax or logic) enjoyed an a priori status- they are logically 
prior to linguistic practices - in the PI the rules (grammar or logic) derive from human 
socio-linguistic practices. Thus the rules in the TLP are a priori whereas the rules in 
the PI are contingent. One could also say that the rules in the TLP exist independently 
of us, whereas in the PI the rules depend, in a manner of speaking, on us. Our socio-
linguistic practices form the background which determines the meaning of a sign. 
Furthermore, in the TLP there was a single set of rules- the rules of truth-functional 
logic. In the PI we find sets of rules: different language-games dictate different uses of 
words and hence different rules of licit sentence construction. (Each language-game 
has its own set of rules.) It is a bit misleading, though, to talk of a set of rules, as if the 
set is .fixed, since the conception of language in the PI is that it is open-ended. 
Nevertheless the point here is that each language-game has its own rules. There is thus 
no longer talk of the logic oflanguage- rather, ... .logics10 - and thus no longer talk of 
10 Talk of different logics is only meant to convey the idea that different language-games have 
different rules. I do not mean to convey the idea that philosophers like the Churchlands endorse when 
they talk about physicalistic language versus folk-psychological language in philosophy of mind. For 
the Churchlands, folk-psychological language can be reduced to, and fully replaced by, physicalistic 
language, hence the former can be totally eliminated. The latter is a replacement of the former, since 
the one is reduced to the other. The two are thus not different language-games in the sense in which 
poetry and factual language, for example, are different games. They are two ways of talking about the 
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the limit oflanguage, but limits of language. Furthermore, whereas in the TLP the limit 
was a single line dividing factual from non-factual discourse (genuine propositions 
from illicit sentence constructions), in the PI the limits run criss-cross, taking the form 
of a network of boundaries. What counts as a proposition in one language-game may 
not in another. 
The new linguistic terrain has a much more complex geography: it is not only factual 
discourse which features on the linguistic landscape. Other kinds of discourse now also 
count as legitimate. Whereas on the old account of language, religion and ethics were 
not players in the game, on the new account, religion and ethics have a place. They 
constitute linguistic practices and as such are meaningful. So the area of propositional 
discourse is now sub-divided. But furthermore, and importantly, the area ofjactual 
discourse is no longer an homogenous domain. Wittgenstein also came to recognise 
that factual discourse consists in subtle variations which in fact constitute various 
different language-games; for instance, talk about material objects, on the one hand, 
and talk about sensations, on the other, constitute different kinds of talk, different 
language-games. 11 For one thing, the individuation and ascription of sensations and 
material objects differ. One can ask whether person B now has the car person A 
formerly had - since a car's individuation criteria are not dependent on anyone owning 
it. But this is not so with sensations. It is illegitimate to ask whether person B now has 
the pain (sensation-token) person A formerly had, since the individuation criteria of a 
pain are tied up with an owner. There cannot be pains without owners and the 
individuation criteria of a particular pain (token) is tied up with a particular owner, so 
pains cannot be transferred or sold! But there can be cars without owners. The point 
here is that the kinds of questions one can ask about sensations differ from the ones 
one can ask about physical objects. Another example is where one could say: 'I have a 
same phenomena where the one is regarded as correct or legitimate. Furthermore, the replaced (or 
reduced) language becomes obsolete and the replacer language talks about the particular phenomenon 
in such a way that it leaves nothing out. In other words, nothing is lost when the one language is 
replaced by the other. In the PI scenario however, two different language-games 'tell the story' in 
different ways. The one cannot be replaced by the other without something of the content of the 
former being lost. So, for instance, factual discourse cannot replace the ideas conveyed in a poem. 
(Ofcourse the relation between language-games is not always like this. The language of sensations and 
the language of physical objects, for example, are not linked in this way.) 
11 Pears, D.F. 1971 uses this example. 
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lot of marbles', and could be asked: 'give me some of your marbles'; but, though one 
could say: 'I have a lot of patience', it could not be asked: 'give me some ofyour 
patience'. Why not? The reason is that the two expressions belong to different 
language-games - marbles and patience are two different categories of things (physical 
substance and mental attribute). Different rules apply to the way these words are used. 
(Of course these rules do not derive from the natures of the objects for which the 
names stand; that is, it is not that the rules that apply to them are different on account 
of the fact that they are different categories of things. Rather, it is that it just so 
happens that marbles and patience belong to different language-games when it comes 
to individuation and ascription). The request 'give me some .... ' can only be made in 
the context of material objects. It becomes an illegitimate question in the context of 
mental attributes. The point here is that factual discourse is not homogenous. The 
picture in the TLP is one of a single line creating two columns, with representational 
discourse on the one side and non-representational discourse on the other. The picture 
in the PI, however, is one resembling a sub-divided pie- each division occupied by a 
different language-game. 
A question that could arise here is: of what significance are all these internal 
boundaries - apart from allowing us to appreciate the richness and variation in human 
language - when Wittgenstein' s task was really to plot the outer boundary of language 
(drawn of course, from the inside)? In other words, Wittgenstein's task was to 
delineate sense (this side ofthe boundary) from nonsense (on the far side ofthe 
boundary). Where is this crucial external boundary in the PI? In the new picture of 
language - that is, language as a subdivided pie - there is no external boundary which 
delineates meaningful from nonsensical discourse. The boundaries of this pie separate 
different language-games. Each language-game has a boundary, and what lies on the 
other side of a language-game is another language-game. 
However, given this, how is nonsensical discourse produced? In answering this 
question one must remember that in the TLP the nonsense that is produced by crossing 
the limit is factual nonsense; crossing the limit consisted in saying something which did 
not conform to the rules of syntax and hence was not part of factual discourse. 
Because factual discourse was, for Wittgenstein, all that could intelligibly be said, any 
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expression which failed to be an assertoric or factual one was regarded as nonsensical. 
In the PI the situation is a little more complex (there is more than just factual 
language). But crossing the limit also consists in producingfactual nonsense. 
However, crossing the limit in the PI consists in attempting to operate in two different 
areas of discourse at the same time - where the one area of discourse is factual and the 
other non-factual. For example, if one treats religious or ethical discourse as if they 
are factual discourse (by applying the rules of factual discourse to religious discourse) 
one produces factual nonsense. One treats the religious (or ethical) as if it belongs to 
the category of material objects - for example, by applying individuation or ascription 
criteria which pertain to material objects to an ethical or religious category of things. 
Suppose one said 'God is omnipotent', and it is then asked: 'Can God set a task for 
Himself which is impossible for Him to do?' If one answers 'no' to this question, the 
retort may be: 'Does that mean that God is not omnipotent?' The Wittgensteinian 
response would be something to this effect: we know what 'powerful' means (know 
how it is or can be used). And we may use the expression 'all powerful', say, for 
extreme despotic governments. However, the notion 'all powerful' when applied to 
God does not have the same application criteria as it does when applied to the factual 
domain. This is religious talk and one cannot ask questions about this kind of talk by 
applying rules which apply to factual discourse. To mix rules is to break rules and to 
break rules it to produce nonsense - in this case, to treat religious statements as factual 
statements. However, if one were to engage in religious talk without crossing the 
limits, then such talk would, on the PI account, be legitimate. What we may not do is 
try to make sense of discourse in one category by applying criteria of word-usage 
which belong to another category. To do so is to cross the limits, to stray from one 
area of discourse into another, while still keeping a foot in the one. Thus to cross the 
limits amounts to passing off a statement about one category of phenomenon (factual) 
in terms appropriate to another kind of phenomenon (ethics, religion)- that is, to make 
a category mistake, or to mix up language-games. To cross the limit is to apply the 
rules of one language-game to things which belong to another language-game, and in 
so doing producing an illicit sentence-construction. And, as we know, an illicit 
sentence construction - a sentence construction which fails to conform to syntax (TLP) 
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or grammar (W - is not a genuine part oflanguage. The point is that to mix up rules is 
to break rules. 
Both in the TLP and the PI, the reasons given for the realisation of metaphysical 
tendencies (that is, attempting to express ultimate claims) has to do with the deceptive 
character of language. This deceptive surface structure provides a vehicle for the 
expression of metaphysical tendencies. For example, we are inclined to make ultimate 
claims about reality. We want to say what 'the good' consists in, what the ultimate 
nature and structure of the world is, what makes language possible, and so on. 
Because we are blind to the underlying logical structure, we express these 'ultimate 
thoughts' in language and don't see that we've produced nonsense. Ideally, according 
to the TLP, if we had before us a perspicuous representation of our language - one that 
laid bare its true nature by means of analysis - we would see that certain kinds of 
expressions are illegitimate. In the PI the diagnosis is more or less the same. Language 
still misleads us. But there is not, as there is in the TLP, a gulf between surface and 
underlying logical structure. The PI does away with talk of an underlying grammatical 
structure; rather, the gulf (if one could call it so) is articulated as between surface and 
deep grammar. The true logic of our language does not lie underneath; rather, it lies on 
the surface, open to view. However, we often take one form of representation to be 
analogous to another when it is not. And (part of) the reason we do this is that we lack 
not a perspicuous representation of what lies hidden but an Ubersicht or surview- that 
is, a descriptive account of the (customary) uses of language, of language-in-use. Deep 
grammar, then, does not lie underneath surface structure; deep grammar is what is 
revealed when we have an Ubersicht. The cure for metaphysical expressions is, in the 
two works, similar. The perspicuous representation (TLP) or Ubersicht ~I) keeps us 
sober; it helps us to see our transgression and make a come-back. 
There are, however, differences. In the TLP the way to cure metaphysical meandering 
as well as the way to prevent a meandering in the first place was to have before one 
this perspicuous representation. (This is suggested in the preface to the TLP: the 
reason why philosophical problems are posed ' ... .is that the logic of our language is 
misunderstood.' The corollary of this is that if we had our logic in order we wouldn't 
ask metaphysical questions). The situation in the PI is a little different: in order to stop 
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misusing language and breaking rules, the ideal thing to do is to go ahead and follow 
the temptation to do metaphysics - to commit the offence by theorizing and in so doing 
attempting to break the rules. We must allow ourselves to be tempted to theorize. 
Then, once we have felt that urge, and through committing the offence, we should be 
reminded of the genuine or everyday use oflanguage. Only then will we be able 
properly to understand our language - that is, it is only in the context of first having 
done the wrong that what is right can be properly understood. 
This method is clearly different from that suggested in the TLP. There it was simply a 
matter of presenting the logic of our language to someone who wanted to say 
something metaphysical. This would then have the appropriate deterring effect. But in 
the PI the idea is that we must first be led up the garden path - be allowed to make the 
mistake - and then be stopped. We must discover the limits for ourselves. 
Why this difference? Because in the TLP Wittgenstein attempted to provide us with a 
general theory of the limits of factual language. The idea was that, using it, we could 
simply 'flash the formula' when anyone made a mismove and stop him in his tracks. In 
the PI no such general account is provided ahead of time (and in fact, no such general 
account can be provided), so one has actually to discover the limits by trial and error. 
We have to uncover the nonsense by having our understanding run its head up against 
the limits of language. It's only when we do this that we discover the limits. The limits 
must be plotted by first making a deliberate attempt to go beyond them. The way to 
find the limits it not by setting out to draw a sweeping definitive line but, in the words 
ofPears12, by oscillating back and forth across the limits and so discovering them. The 
important difference to see here between the TLP and the PI is that in the TLP 
Wittgenstein saw his project to be one of drawing the limit (he attempted to give the 
logically necessary conditions for language to work), whereas in the PI the project is 
seen as one discovering the limits. The limits lie open to view. All we must do is self-
consciously move about the terrain of linguistic discourse and in so doing discover the 
limits, and this discovery is made by first attempting to cross them and seeing that such 
an attempt gets you into trouble. This can be compared to attempting to sit on a 
wobbly chair, but not knowing ahead of time the amount of pressure to apply so that 
12Pears, D.F. 1971, p123. 
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the chair does not break any further. To discover the (maximum) amount of pressure 
you can apply, you proceed slowly and gradually increase the pressure until you come 
to a point where you have in fact exceeded the maximum amount and you see that the 
chair 'gives' a little further. You know now that that amount of pressure is too much-
you know now that you have exceeded the maximum, that you have exceeded the 
limit. The limit is discovered by first having gone beyond it. If you had known the limit 
ahead oftime there would have been nothing to discover. You would have known 
when to stop applying pressure because you would have had a measurement, or a kind 
of formula which dictated the point at which to stop. This of course was how it was in 
the TLP: Wittgenstein had provided us ahead of time with a 'formula' for a 
proposition, derived from his account of the structure and function of language. 
Suppose someone drew up an extensive Ubersicht- an extensive, though necessarily 
incomplete, surview of the workings oflanguage, oflanguage-in-use. Why could he 
not present this surview to us, so that we can avoid the pitfalls of incorrect use of 
language and so save us the trouble of making many mistakes? His Ubersicht would 
then serve as an extremely complex and rich version of the TLP' s comparatively simple 
and straightforward 'perspicuous representation'. The reason is that Wittgenstein 
believed that there was value in making a mistake. It is in fact only when you have felt 
the force of linguistic temptation that an Ubersicht (of an expression) can have 
significance for you. To be given an answer when you haven't asked a question- in 
this case, when you have not felt the confusion of a linguistic mistake - is of no use. Of 
such mistakes Wittgenstein says: 'These bumps make us see the value of the discovery.' 
~I 119).This is perhaps why the PI takes us through so many 'mistakes'- to make us 
feel the problem. 
So there seem to be two important reasons for Wittgenstein's different treatment of 
metaphysical urges in the PI. First, he now believes that the limits can only be properly 
understood after one had made the (unsuccessful) attempt to cross them. (In the TLP 
he felt that the impasse ofthe barrier would be felt from the inside). And secondly, he 
realises that the limit cannot be drawn ahead of time, because language does not admit 
of a uniform structure. The limits have to be discovered, case by case, instance by 
instance. Each individual case must be considered in its own right. 
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Pears makes the point that Wittgenstein's anthropocentrism is a version of what can be 
called Hume's 'psychological naturalism'. Hume, in his treatment of causality, claims 
that causal reasoning is not based on anything in experience. Rather, the conviction 
that events are causally linked derives from our psychology. All that there really is in 
the world are constant conjunctions of events. That these events are causally linked is a 
contribution from our own minds. Our minds project causal relations onto the world. 
Causality is a feature of our psychology. In the PI cause and effect reasoning is treated 
as an aspect of grammar. (This, incidentally, is also how it is treated in the TLP, 
except that the notion of'syntax' and not 'grammar' is used there.) To say that it is an 
aspect of grammar, in the context ofthe PI, is to say that it is an aspect of how we 
happen to think about the world. The point Pears wants to make is that for both 
Wittgenstein and Hume there is no objective reason or explanation as to why humans 
reason in terms of cause and effect. For Hume the only explanation one can give is the 
fact that it is just an aspect of human psychology. In this sense Hume falls into the 
category of what Glock13 calls pyschologistic logicians: the logical inferences humans 
perform derive from how they happen to think - from how their minds happen to work. 
The Wittgenstein of the PI holds a similar view. Causality is not a feature of the world; 
rather, it is a feature of how we happen to think. But, whereas Hume held that the 
reason we reason causally is that we happen, as a matter of our psychology, to do so, 
the Wittgenstein of the PI says that the reason for our various patterns of thought is 
just that that is what we happen to do. It is not an aspect of our psychology but of 
human linguistic behaviour. Thus, whereas Hume's position is apychologistic 
naturalism, Wittgenstein's is a linguistic naturalism. Compare this with the view of the 
Wittgenstein of the TLP and that of Kant. For them the thought patterns we engage in 
are not just how we happen to think, but how we must think given that language is 
possible: they are the preconditions of thought, the logically prior conditions that make 
thought possible. However, unlike Kant, who held that the mind contributes these 
logically prior features, the Wittgenstein of the TLP believed that these forms or 
patterns of thought derive from the logical structure of the world. 
13Glock, H.J.,l996. (See also p30 of this thesis.) 
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In this concluding section I have presented some of the key differences between the 
TLP and the PI. The area that underwent the greatest revision is, as we have seen, the 
account of language. Despite these changes, however, Wittgenstein' s project remained 
the same - namely, to draw the limit oflanguage, to establish that the limit is 
inexpressible and to delineate what can be said from what cannot be said but only 
shown. The theme of my thesis has been to understand why and how philosophical 
propositions (metaphysics) came to have the status they did in the TLP. Since the 
account of metaphysics is directly bound up with the account of language, my task was 
to examine the conclusions on metaphysics by examining the account of language. In 
my brief overview of the PI, I have suggested that his concern with the limit of 
language is very much present in the PI and that his conception of metaphysics 
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